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The Future of Foreclosure Law in the Wake of the 
Great Housing Crisis of 2007–2014 
Judith Fox* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE CRISIS AND RESPONSE 
As 2014 came to an end so, perhaps, did the worst foreclosure crisis in 
U.S. history.  On January 15, 2015, RealtyTrac, one of the nation’s leading 
reporters of housing data, declared the foreclosure crisis had ended.1  Whether 
its declaration proves true, the aftermath of the crisis will be felt for years to 
come.  During the crisis it is estimated more than five million families lost their 
homes to foreclosure.2  Federal, state, and local responses to the crisis changed 
laws and perceptions regarding foreclosure.  Despite these changes, we end the 
crisis much the way we began—with a nationwide foreclosure system 
mistrusted and disliked by lenders and consumers alike.  This Article examines 
the responses to the crisis in an effort to determine what worked, what did not, 
and where foreclosure law should go from here.  In the end, it is clear that we 
need a more uniform system, but one that also prioritizes homeownership, or at 
least home occupancy. 
A.  The Crisis 
In the early morning hours of September 13, 2008, the financial world 
shook when it was announced that Lehman Brothers, one of the nation’s 
premier financial institutions, had failed.3  For many people, this was the 
 
 *  Clinical Professor at Notre Dame Law School.  I would like to thank my faculty for their support and 
helpful feedback relating to this article, especially Jim Kelly, John Robinson, Margaret Brinig, and Robert 
Jones. 
 1. In its 2014 year-end summary of foreclosures, RealtyTrac reports that foreclosure filings were down 
sixty-one percent from their 2006 peak and that foreclosure is “stabilizing at a historically normal level.”  
REALTYTRAC, 1.1 Million US Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2014, Down 18 Percent From 2013 to 
Lowest Level Since 2006, available at, http://www.realtytrac.com/news/foreclosure-trends/1-1-million-u-s-
properties-with-foreclosure-filings-in-2014-down-18-percent-from-2013-to-lowest-level-since-2006/ (last 
visited April 14, 2015) [Hereinafter Foreclosure Filings]. 
 2. CoreLogic reported in January of 2014 that 4.9 million homes had been lost from 2008 to 2014.  The 
crisis began earlier than 2008 and another year has passed since the report was issued.  Therefore, five million 
is a very conservative estimate of how many homes have been lost.  CORELOGIC: NATIONAL FORECLOSURE 
REPORT, Jan. 14, 2014, available at http://www.corelogic.com/research/foreclosure-report/national-
foreclosure-report-january-2014.pdf. 
 3. In the early morning hours of September 13, 2008, I was getting ready to begin a lecture on some 
changes to regulations relating to credit cards to a roomful of banking attorneys, when I got an email from a 
colleague in Washington, D.C. telling me an announcement was about to made that Lehman would be allowed 
to go into bankruptcy.  Foolishly, I passed on the news and watched my seminar turn into a room of panic-
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psychological beginning of the financial crisis.  By September 2008, however, 
we were already deep into the mortgage foreclosure crisis and, as we would 
later learn, well into a recession.4  The causes of the financial crisis are still 
being debated.5  Foreclosures generally rise in bad economic times, but this 
foreclosure crisis was historic.  While researchers will likely never agree on a 
single cause for the duration and depth of the foreclosure crisis, several theories 
consistently rise to the top: subprime lending, a housing bubble, lax 
underwriting standards, dropping home prices, credit default swaps, and the 
deregulation of the lending industry.6  All of these likely contributed to the 
problem; but this Article is not concerned with how the crisis started.  This 
Article focuses on the responses to the crisis and what the crisis should teach 
us about foreclosure policy going forward. 
B.  The Response 
The housing bubble began to burst in early 2007.7  Federal response to the 
growing number of foreclosures was slow and ineffective.  The HOPENOW 
program, a voluntary program created by the Bush Administration, was 
supposed to assist homeowners in modifying their loans to stem the tide of 
foreclosures.8  The program is largely regarded as a failure.9  The loan 
modifications that were accomplished did little to alleviate the debt burden of 
homeowners.10  It is not surprising that large numbers of homeowners re-
 
stricken, email and tweeting, attorneys.  So much for the seminar.  For a more critical analysis of the moment, 
see FIN. CRISIS COMM’N: FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 324–43 (2011) [hereinafter Commission Report]. 
 4. The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the committee 
charged with identifying business cycles in the United States, marked the official start of the recession as 
December 2007.  NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Determination of the December 2007 in Econ. Activity, 
available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
 5. The governmental analysis of the causes and effects of the crisis can be found in the Commission 
Report, supra note 3.  There has been no shortage of scholars weighing in.  See generally Ben Bernanke, THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Princeton, 2001); Alan Blinder & Andrew W. Lo, RETHINKING 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Russell Sage Foundation, 2013); Michael Lewis, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE 
DOOMSDAY MACHINE (Norton 2010); Richard Posner, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM (Harvard, 2009); Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, TOO BIG TO FAIL (Penguin 2010). 
 6. For a concise summary of the Financial Inquiry Commission’s conclusions as to the causes of the 
crisis, see Commission Report, supra note3, xv–xxviii. 
 7. Housing prices peaked in 2006 and then began to fall.  See id. at 215.  “[B]y the end of 2009, prices 
would drop 28% from their peak in 2006.”  Id. at 215..  Securitization of subprime loans dropped from $75 
billion in the second quarter of 2007 to $12 billion in the fourth quarter.  Mortgage lending would eventually 
all but halt.  Id. at 214. 
 8. See Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 723, 736 (2013); Alan White, Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage 
Modifications from 2007 and 2008 Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 509, 516 (2008); Press 
Release, HOPENOW, HOPE NOW Alliance Created to Help Distressed Homeowners (Oct. 10, 2007) 
(available at https://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=269436). 
 9. See Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The failure of the Voluntary Mortgage 
Contract Modifications 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107 (2009) (providing a comprehensive analysis of all the ways in 
which the voluntary loan program failed). 
 10. White, supra note 8, at 529.  In this study, Professor White found that 23 percent of the modifications 
did not change the monthly payment and 23 percent actually increased it.  Id. at 530. 
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defaulted.11 
The number of foreclosures continued to grow, ballooning to a historic 
high of 2,871,891 foreclosure filings in 2010.12  Congress passed the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in 2008, which was “intended to, 
among other things, preserve home ownership and protect home values.”13  
This led to the creation of the Obama Administration’s Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) in 2009.14  HAMP created a “waterfall” which 
required participating servicers15 to follow a specific set of steps in an attempt 
to modify troubled mortgages in order to reduce monthly payments “to as close 
to 31 percent of gross income as possible.”16  The program has been more 
successful in avoiding foreclosures than previous efforts, but is still mired in 
problems.17  The modification programs are complicated, requiring substantial 
confusing paperwork and multiple changes to existing servicer software.18  
Servicers had neither the will19 nor the capacity to deal with the magnitude of 
 
 11. White, supra, note 8, at 519.  More than one-half of the loan modifications made in 2008 defaulted 
within one year.  Less than one quarter were current in early 2010.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, 
REBUILDING AMERICA: HOW STATES CAN SAVE MILLIONS OF HOMES THROUGH FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 4 
(Feb. 2012) [hereinafter REBUILDING AMERICA]. 
 12. Foreclosure Filings, supra note 1. 
 13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-288, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: 
TREASURY CONTINUES TO FACE IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND DATA WEAKNESSES IN ITS MAKING 
HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, 1 (2011) [hereinafter TARP REPORT]. 
 14. Home Affordable Modification Program, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html (last visited April 14, 2015).  The 
initial program was just intended to aid borrowers in first-lien, residential properties.  Since its inception, it has 
been expanded to include numerous other programs, including the 2MP (Second Lien Modification Program), 
a program to identify and modify second mortgages; HAFA (Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives 
Program), a program to assist with deed-in-lieu or short sale transfers; PRA (Principal Reduction Alternative 
SM), a program to encourage principal write downs, HARP (Home Affordable Refinance Program), a program 
that allows certain underwater borrowers to refinance; UP (Home Affordable Unemployment Program), a 
program to offer forbearance if you are unemployed; HHF (Hardest Hit Funds), state-administered programs 
funded by the federal government to assist borrowers in certain counties hardest hit by foreclosure.  The 
Veteran’s Administration, FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac all have variations of these programs. 
 15. Allan S. Glass, The HAMP Waterfall—Qualifying for a Loan Modification, L.A. REAL EST. BLOG, 
http://allanglass.featuredblog.come/?p=123 (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).  While HAMP is technically a 
voluntary program banks, especially those that accepted TARP bail out money were expected, if not 
specifically required, to sign on. 
 16. TARP REPORT, supra note 13, at 7. 
Servicers must first capitalize accrued interest and certain expenses paid to third parties and add this 
amount to the loan balance (principal) amount.  Next, the interest rate must be reduced in increments 
of one-eighth of 1 percent until the 31 percent DTI target is reached, but servicers may not reduce 
interest rates below 2 percent.  If the interest rate reduction does not result in a DTI ration of 31 
percent, servicers must then extend the maturity and/or amortization period of the loan in 1-month 
increments up to 40 years.  Finally, if the target DTI ratio is still not reached, the servicer must 
forbear, or defer, principal until the payment is reduced to the 31 percent target.  Servicers may also 
forgive mortgage principal. 
Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 20–25. 
 19. Several studies have been conducted that suggest “the payment structure for servicing may provide 
incentives for servicers to forego a modification even if modification would serve the lenders’ or investors’ 
interests.”  Vicki Been et al., Determinants of the Incidence of U.S. Mortgage Loan Modifications, 37 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 3951, 3952 (2013); Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths and 
Realities, Finance and Economics,, FED. RES. BD. OF WASH. D.C., 18 (2008) available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200846/200846pap.pdf; Adam Levitin & Tara Twomey, 
Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE L. ON REG. 1 (2011); Dan Magder, Mortgage Loan Modifications: Program 
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the crisis.20 
State and local governments, frustrated by the growing number of 
abandoned properties and the lack of a successful federal intervention, began 
to take matters into their own hands.21  Governments and courts created 
foreclosure modification programs.22  Although they vary greatly from state-
to-state, and even from county-to-county, they all share one common theme.  
They all require mortgage service providers to meet fact-to-face with 
homeowners in an effort to facilitate loan modifications.23 
Additionally, local governments got creative and enacted ordinances in an 
attempt to stem the growing number of abandoned properties resulting from the 
crisis.24  San Bernardino County, California took things one step further when 
it began exploring how to use eminent domain to buy mortgages on underwater 
properties and re-write them to avoid foreclosures.25  Other cities announced 
their intent to follow suit.26  This has set off a national debate that is still 
raging.27 
Much of the local effort for alternative solutions comes from a frustration 
with the accelerated pace of foreclosures and the resulting abandoned 
 
Incentives and Restructuring Design, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (2009); Joseph R Mason, Mortgage 
Loan Modification: Promises and Pitfalls (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027470; Diane 
Thompson, Why Servicers Foreclosure When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer Behavior: 
Servicer Compensation and its Consequences, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER (2009), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-servicers-modify.pdf. 
 20. TARP REPORT, supra, note 13, at 11.  “Loan loss mitigation is labor intensive and thus raises servicing 
costs, which in turn make it more likely that a servicer would forego loss mitigation and pursue foreclosure 
even if the investor would be better off if the foreclosure were avoided.”  Cordell, supra note 19 at 15; Jeffrey 
P. Hulett, Loan Modifications and HAMP, 92 THE RMA J. 14, 16–17 (2010) (categorizing the issues both with 
the culture of the servicer and implementation of the necessary technology); Neil J. Morse, News from Loan-
Modification Front, 70 MORTG. BANKING30 (2010) (noting the complexity of the program and frequent 
changes are beyond the servicers’ ability to handle). 
 21. See Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 34, 1 (2011); Cordell, supra note 19; Geoff Walsh, The Finger 
in the Dike: State and Local Laws Combat the Foreclosure Tide, 44 SUFFOLK U.L. REV 139 (2011) (giving a 
broad overview of various strategies used by state and local governments). 
 22. See REBUILDING AMERICA, supra note 11 (explaining the various mediation programs that existed 
by February 2012 and their relative success rates). 
 23. Id. at 17–20. 
 24. Mary Ellen Podmolik, Chicago Loses Court Challenge to Vacant Building Registry, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 
26, 2013), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-26/business/chi-chicago-vacant-building-
registry-20130825_1_fhfa-federal-housing-finance-agency-fannie-mae (reporting on FHFA’s challenge to an 
ordinance that required mortgage holders to register and pay $500 for each abandoned property).  The article 
claims that “[m]ore than 1,000 municipalities around the country” have enacted similar ordinances.  Id.  
Another creative, and as of yet unsuccessful, idea was to use eminent domain as a means of taking over the 
mortgages and making them affordable to avoid foreclosures.  See also Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. City of 
Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N. Dist. Ill, 2013). 
 25. Jennifer Medina, California County Weight Drastic Plan to Aid Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/us/a-county-considers-rescue-of-underwater-
homes.pdf. 
 26. Shaila Dewan, More Cities Consider Using Eminent Domain to Halt Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
15, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/business/more-cities-consider-eminent-domain-
to-halt-foreclosures.html?_r=0. 
 27. Raymond H. Brescia & Nicholas M. Martin, The Price of Crisis: Eminent Domain, Local 
Governments, and the Value of Underwater Mortgages, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014); Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater 
Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN. 1, 2013. 
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properties, coupled with the slow pace of loan modification.  As the programs 
to encourage loan modification increased, so did allegations of servicer abuse 
relating to homeowners’ failed attempts to obtain loan modification.28  A 
pattern of deliberate efforts to thwart loan modification began to emerge.  As 
one former employee said in an affidavit, the “practice is to string homeowners 
along with no apparent intention of providing the permanent loan modification” 
promised.29  Others claim they were instructed to tell customers that their loan 
modification packets were incomplete, even when it was clear “all the 
documentation was in” the bank’s system.30  Pressure began to mount on the 
industry to make changes. 
When it seemed that things could not get any worse, the “robo-signing” 
scandal broke.31  Two distinct problems became evident.  In the rush to 
securitize loans, it appears that banks failed to get the proper loan endorsements 
needed to transfer the notes into the securitized trusts.32  Instead, they were 
fraudulently recreating documents and having employees forge 
endorsements.33  A second, but related, problem arose from the affidavits that 
banks were submitting to prove the mortgage default and amount due and 
owing.  Employees were signing thousands of affidavits per day, attesting to 
the accuracy of documents and figures for accounts they had never seen.34  The 
big lenders halted foreclosures in all judicial foreclosure states—twenty-three 
 
 28. Hearing on Mortgage Services, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing 
and Community Opportunity, 111th Cong. 9–11 (2010) (statement of the Honorable Elizabeth A. Duke, 
Governor, Federal Reserve System) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg63124/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg63124.pdf. 
 29. Affidavit of Erika Brown at 1, Kahlo v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2:10-cv-00488 JLR, (W.D. Wash. Jun. 7, 
2013).  In her affidavit, Theresa Terrelonge stated that “Based on what I observed, Bank of America was trying 
to prevent as many homeowners as possible from obtaining permanent HAMP loan modifications while leading 
the public and the government to believe that it was making efforts to comply with HAMP.”  Affidavit of 
Theresa Terrelonge at 4, In re Bank of Am., 1:10-md-02193-RWZ (D. Mass. Jun. 7, 2013). 
 30. Affidavit of Recorda Simon at 4, In re Bank of Am., 1:10-md-02193-RWZ (D. Mass. Jun. 7, 2013); 
In her affidavit, Simone Gordon also indicated that employees were instructed to lie to homeowners, telling 
them their documents had not been received even when they had.  Affidavit of Simone Gordon at 4, In re Bank 
of Am., 1:10-md-02193-RWZ (D. Mass. Jun. 7, 2013). 
 31. See, e.g., David H. Carpenter, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41491, “ROBO-SIGNING” AND OTHER 
ALLEGED DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL AND NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCESSES(Nov. 15, 
2010); Gretchen Morgenson, Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES  (Oct. 3, 2010)  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/business/04mortgage.html?_r=0. 
 32. Foreclosure Documentation Issues Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community Opportunity 111th Cong. (2010) (citing the testimony of Elizabeth A. Duke, 
Governor, Federal Reserve System) http://www.bis.org/review/r101124e.pdf; see also Elizabeth Renuart, 
Uneasy Intersections: The Right to Foreclosure and the U.C.C., 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV.1205, 1208–10 
(2013) (explaining the importance of the paperwork in foreclosure). 
 33. Karen Weise, Mortgage Fraud Whistle-Blower Lynn Szymoniak Exposed Robosigning’s Sins, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-09-
12/mortgage-fraud-whistle-blower-lynn-szymoniak-exposed-robosignings-sins (exposing the “Linda Green” 
robo-signing scandal in Florida). 
 34. Carpenter, supra note 31, at 15.  In Maine, pro bono attorney Tom Cox uncovered the robo-signing 
of affidavits of debt after deposing GMAC employee Jeffrey Stevens.  Debra Cassens Weiss, How 2 Pro Bono 
Lawyers Uncovered ‘Robo-Signer,’ Halting Foreclosures in 23 States, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 23. 2010), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_2_pro_bono_lawyers_uncovered_robo-
signer_halting_foreclosures_in_23_sta/. 
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at the time.35  This scandal resulted in a $25 billion settlement between forty-
nine of the nation’s attorneys general and the five largest mortgage servicers 
that required specific action be taken to modify mortgage loans in foreclosure.36 
The responses to the crisis and the resulting problems in the mortgage 
market were defensive and, as such, implemented in an ad hoc, reactive way 
across the country.  This Article examines the responses to the crisis in an effort 
to determine what worked, what did not, and where foreclosure law should go 
from here.  It adds to a growing sense that foreclosure law needs to be more 
uniform, less reactive, and more fair to consumers and communities.  Unlike 
others, however, this Article recommends a move to more, not less, judicial 
supervision of the foreclosure process. 
II.  MORTGAGE LAW AND THE CASE FOR UNIFORMITY 
A.  Foreclosure Law 
States are fiercely proprietary about their property law.  Like most 
American law, the law of mortgages first developed in England.37  Under 
English law, the lender held title to the property until the mortgage was paid.38  
This is known as the title theory of mortgages and is the law in many states, 
usually those that were formed early in America’s development.39  The 
competing theory is the lien theory which vests ownership with the borrower, 
subject to defaulting on the mortgage.40  Two distinct documents are used to 
create the security interest, a mortgage, or a deed of trust.41  In states that 
recognize deeds of trust, ownership is actually vested in a third-party, the 
trustee, until the mortgage is paid.42  In the early nineteenth century, American 
states began to move from the title theory to the lien theory, with New York 
leading the way in 1828.43  While there is no consistent pattern, older states 
tend to follow the title theory, while newer states are more likely to be lien 
theory states.44  This was the first step in the move to multiple foreclosure 
systems. 
Under the title theory of mortgages, when a borrower failed to make his 
payments, the property was automatically transferred to the mortgagee “without 
 
 35. Carpenter, supra note 31 at 1. 
 36. Weise, supra note 33.  The five servicers are: Chase, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and 
GMAC.  Attorneys General on the Exec. Comm., Joint State-Federal Mortgage Servicing Settlement FAQ, 
available at http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/faq (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
 37. Harold C. Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage Foreclosure Procedure: Possibilities Suggested by 
Honeyman v. Jacobs, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 960 (1940). 
 38. Andra Ghent, The Historical Origins of America’s Mortgage Laws, RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM., 
1 (Oct. 19, 2012). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 7. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 15. 
 44. Id. at 16. 
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the necessity of further legal action.”45  In the early seventeenth century, 
English mortgage law “underwent a seismic shift with the introduction of the 
concept of the equity of redemption.”46  Courts of equity intervened in 
situations of default creating the right of redemption and the requirement of a 
foreclosure sale.47  Settlers brought this concept to the colonies and early 
foreclosure procedures in America followed this tradition.48  Default required 
a judicial process that allowed homeowners who fell behind to redeem the 
property after the sale by paying the balance due.49  The law of foreclosure 
began to develop as lenders attempted “to foreclose” this right of redemption 
granted by equity.50  What originated as a strict foreclosure process soon moved 
to a judicial process followed by a foreclosure sale.51  Again, New York led the 
way.52 
Lenders reacted to these changes by developing power of sales clauses in 
their loan documents.  A power of sale clause allows the home to be sold if 
there is a default, without the necessity of court action.53  Courts were initially 
reluctant to honor these clauses.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
the validity of these clauses in 1827 in Newman v. Jackson,54 it took many years 
before states began adopting non-judicial foreclosure processes that allowed for 
due on sale clause foreclosure.55  The law developed as the country was 
expanding and new states picked the rules that best suited them.  As a result, 
state foreclosure laws are far from uniform today. 
Commentators generally classify foreclosure law as falling into one of two 
categories: judicial and non-judicial.56  Judicial states are usually thought of as 
states where the lender needs to initiate a court action in order to foreclose.57  
Non-judicial, or “power of sale,” foreclosure is permitted in thirty states and 
the District of Columbia.58  In these states, the document governing the security 
interest, either a mortgage or deed of trust, gives the lender the authority to sell 
the property shortly after notice of default is given.  Because some states allow 
 
 45. Vaughn, supra note 37, at 959.  This process known as “strict foreclosure” is still used in parts of 
New England.  Id. at 960. 
 46. Ghent, supra note 38, at 12. 
 47. Vaughn, supra note 37, at 960. 
 48. Ghent, supra note 38, at 1. 
 49. Id. at 12. 
 50. Id.  The early definition of equitable redemption applied to the period after acceleration but before a 
foreclosure sale.  See id.  This is distinct from the modern, statutory notion of redemption which relates to the 
period after a sale in which a homebuyer can essentially re-purchase the property for the balance owed.  See 
id. 
 51. Id. at 21.  
 52. Vaughn, supra note 37, at 960. 
 53. John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Foreclosing A Dream: State Laws Deprive Homeowners of Basic 
Protections, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 11–12 (2009). 
 54. 25 U.S. 570 (1827). 
 55. Ghent, supra note 38, at 21. 
 56. For a summary of the laws of each state and the District of Columbia, see JOHN RAO ET AL., 
FORECLOSURES AND MORTGAGE SERVICING INCLUDING LOAN MODIFICATIONS (5th ed., 2014) [hereinafter 
FORECLOSURES]. 
 57. Id. at 388. 
 58. Id. 
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for both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure but prefer one over the other, 
researchers have been confused about which states actually fall into which 
category.59 
This confusion has only grown in recent years as states modified their 
procedures in response to the foreclosure crisis.  Maryland is a good example 
of why it is not always easy to characterize a state’s foreclosure laws.  Maryland 
is considered a non-judicial foreclosure state by some sources, and it is 
considered a judicial foreclosure state by others.60  It is non-judicial in the sense 
that you do not need to initiate a court action to begin a foreclosure, though you 
do have to file a notice, and it is judicial in the sense that, once the property is 
sold, the sale must be ratified by a court, and an accounting of the sales proceeds 
given to the prior homeowner.61 
B.  The Federalization of Mortgage Lending 
When the laws governing mortgage foreclosure were developing, 
mortgage lending was largely a local issue.  It is a completely different issue 
now.  Things began to change during the Great Depression and exploded in the 
1970s.62  The Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) was 
created as a response to the Great Depression.  It was charged with buying up 
mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) and, after 
World War II, with buying loans insured by the Veteran’s Administration as 
well.63  By the late 1960s the number of mortgages owned by Fannie Mae had 
skyrocketed, creating a large debt issue for the federal government.  In 
response, the federal government decided to make Fannie Mae a publicly traded 
corporation.64  Soon afterwards, the Government National Mortgage 
Association (“Ginnie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”) were also created.65  They are known as the GSEs, 
government-sponsored entities, because they are a hybrid between private, 
publicly traded corporation, and public entities, created to acquire government-
backed mortgage loans.66 
In 1970, Ginnie Mae began to securitize its loan portfolio.  The other GSEs 
 
 59. Kristopher Gerardi, Lauren Lambie-Hanson, & Paul S. Willen, Do Borrower Rights Improve 
Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process, 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
17666, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17666 (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
 60. The National Consumer Law Center identifies Maryland as a “power of sale with court supervision” 
state.  FORECLOSURES, supra note 56, at 871.  In Maryland, a mortgagee must serve notice of the foreclosure, 
sell the property, and then a court must ratify the sale.  Id. at 971–72.  This distinguishes Maryland from true 
judicial foreclosure states, where a formal complaint is filed. 
 61. Id. 
 62. For a more detailed description of the changing mortgage market, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 38–51. 
 63. Id. at 38. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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soon followed suit.67  The private market saw the opportunity for profit in the 
securitization of home loan mortgages.  Not only did securitization add lending 
capacity to financial institutions, it added a profit source for the Wall Street 
firms that created the securitized pools.68  At this time the GSEs were restricted 
in what they could own, and therefore they securitized mostly thirty-year fixed 
rate mortgages—the standard, less risky, mortgage product.69  The private 
securitization market was largely cut off from the prime, thirty-year fixed 
market and had to look to other, often riskier, loans for its portfolios.70  Wall 
Street-driven demand for loans to securitize incentivized mortgage lenders and 
brokers to originate more, and riskier subprime loans.71  By 2006, privately 
securitized mortgage pools had grown to $1.15 trillion, dwarfing Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.72  Seventy-one percent were subprime or Alt-A loans.73 
By the early 2000s, the rules governing loan origination were fairly 
uniform and mostly federal.74  The GSEs created standard mortgage documents 
that resulted in even greater uniformity.75  Congress passed a series of laws to 
preempt state mortgage law.76  What we did not have, and in hindsight what 
was probably needed, were uniform underwriting standards.77  In fact, as states 
desperately tried to rein in the abuses of predatory lending, the federal 
government consistently intervened to stop them, claiming federal preemption.  
By preempting state consumer protections, federal agencies—predominately 
 
 67. Id. at 39. 
 68. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan concedes error on regulation, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 23, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?_r=0  (citing Alan 
Greenspan as placing the blame for the crisis on Wall Street because the “demand for the securities was so 
high . . . that Wall Street companies pressured lenders to lower their standards and produce more ‘paper.’ ”).  
The article goes on to quote Greenspan:”[t]he evidence strongly suggests that without the excess demand from 
securitizers, subprime mortgage originations (undeniably the original source of the crisis) would have been far 
smaller and defaults accordingly far lower”)  Id. 
 69. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 42.  But see Todd Zywicki, The Behavioral Law And 
Economics Of Fixed-Rate Mortgages (And Other Just-So Stories), 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 157 (2014). 
(arguing that the thirty-year fixed mortgage is “[a] major cause of the recent financial crisis”). 
 70. While the vast majority of commentators point to the explosion of subprime lending and 
securitization as a leading cause of the foreclosure crisis, at least one well-known scholar disagrees.  Zyqicki, 
supra note 69, at 157. 
 71. Andrews, supra note 68. 
 72. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 102. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2609 and the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA), 15U.S.C. § 1604 set out the requirements for loan origination disclosures. 
 75. Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State 
Mortgage Foreclosure Law,1, 19 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1558492. 
 76. Id. at 21–22.  The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1735 
f-7 (preempting state usury law), Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (assuring enforceability 
of due-on-sale clauses that states were attempting to over-rule), and the Alternative Mortgage Transactions 
Parity Act of 1982 (allowing alternative forms of mortgage loan) are all examples of federal legislation meant 
to preempt state law).  Id. 
 77. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 set out minimum 
requirements for what Congress defined as a “qualified mortgage.”  Lenders who meet these underwriting 
standards are given certain safe harbor protections.  C.F.R. § 1026.43 (colloquially referred to as “Reg. Z”); 
see also CONSUMER FIN. BUREAU, Basic Guidelines for lenders: What is a Qualified Mortgage?, available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_qm-guide-for-lenders.pdf (explaining the rules for a qualified 
mortgage). 
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the Office of the Comptroller of Currency—”weakened lending restrictions for 
national banks and their subsidiaries by substituting binding state consumer 
protection laws with the less stringent federal regulatory structure.”78 
Securitization created yet another significant change in the mortgage 
market: the growth of the loan servicing industry.  When securitized trusts are 
created, an entity is often designated as the servicer to act on behalf of the trust 
to collect payments and initiate foreclosure in case of default.  While the 
volume of loans to be serviced was rising, the number of servicers was 
shrinking.  In 2007, “[t]he largest five firms accounted for 46 percent of the 
residential mortgage market.”79  Eighty-eight percent of the subprime market 
is serviced by only sixteen firms.80  Servicers are, therefore, servicing loans on 
a national basis.  Like loan originating, loan servicing is governed by numerous 
federal regulations.81 
The federal regulations for loan servicing bleed into the law of loan 
foreclosure.  While the actual process for foreclosure is governed by the law of 
the state where the property is located, how a servicer moves from default to 
foreclosure is subject to federal regulation.82  For example, servicers must give 
a specific notice of the default and inform the borrower of the right to contact 
the servicer to seek loss mitigation options.83  In most states, they may also 
have to give additional notices under state law.84  The servicer then must follow 
certain procedures and deadlines to process a loss mitigation application.85  The 
timing of the foreclosure filing is now uniform.  Recent federal regulation 
prohibits the initiation of state procedures to initiate a foreclosure until the loan 
is at least 120 days delinquent.86  It is easy to see how difficult it is for servicers 
whose loan pools come from all over the country to navigate all these various 
procedures. 
 
 78. Lei Ding et al., The Impact of Federal Preemption of State Antipredatory Lending Laws on the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 367, 385 (2012).  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act attempts to prevent a repeat of this by limiting the ability of the regulating 
agencies to preempt more protective state laws.  Id.. 
 79. Cordell, supra note 19, at 13. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2609, expanded by the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990) (codified as 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2605); Regulation X (the implementing regulations for RESPA), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024; the Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1604; Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. part. 1026 (implementing regulations for TILA).  For 
a more comprehensive discussion of the federal mortgage servicing rules, see FORECLOSURES, supra note 56, 
at 53–142. 
 82. The rules do not all apply to all mortgage loans.  For example, some only apply to mortgages on a 
borrower’s primary residence.  12 U.S.C. § 1024.30(c)(2).  For the purposes of this discussion, however, those 
distinctions are not relevant. 
 83. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(b).  It is interesting and significant, that the rules specify requirements 
of loss mitigation procedures.  No specific form of loss mitigation is mandated by the rules.  In fact, a lender 
would be in compliance if it contacted a homeowner to tell him that no loss mitigation options are available. 
 84. FORECLOSURES, supra note 56, at App. F, 963–85. 
 85. Reg. X, 12 C.F.R.§ 1024.41 (a)–(j). 
 86. Id. § 1024.41 (f)(1). 
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C.  Prior Attempts at Uniformity 
There have been multiple attempts to create a uniform mortgage 
foreclosure law.87  The Uniform Law Commission has attempted four times to 
create a uniform act for mortgage foreclosure,88 and a fifth effort is underway.89  
None of the previous attempts at Uniform Acts have been successful.90  
President Nixon attempted to create a uniform foreclosure law with the Federal 
Mortgage Foreclosure Act in 1973; but that too failed.91  The 1994 Single 
Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751–3758, permits Housing 
and Urban Development (“HUD”) to foreclose on residential homes non-
judicially, even in judicial foreclosure states.  Yet, the Act is never used and 
HUD continues to follow the law of the state where the property is located.92 
Numerous scholars and commentators have called for uniform foreclosure 
laws.93  After so much failure, why would anyone want to broach the subject 
again?  There are several reasons.  First, the vast majority of prior attempts 
called for uniform, non-judicial foreclosure.  I do not.  In addition, this crisis 
has presented an opportunity to compare the reasons for and against judicial 
foreclosure and the weight of the evidence supports judicial foreclosure as the 
best option going forward. 
III.  THE CASE FOR NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
The case for non-judicial foreclosure is relatively simple and consistent: 
it is cheaper for the lender.94  In the sense that these costs are usually passed on 
 
 87. Nelson, supra note 75.  
 88. The four attempts are: 1927, Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act; 1940, Model Power of Sale 
Foreclosure Act; 1985 Uniform Land Security Act; and 2002 Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act.  Id. at 15–
16.  No state chose to adopt any of the model acts.  Id. 
 89. See Letter from The American Bankers Association to Mr. William Breetz, Chairman, Uniform Law 
Commission Drafting Committee on a Home Foreclosure Procedures Act Connecticut Urban Legal Initiative, 
Inc. University of Connecticut School of Law (Dec. 12, 2014) (on file with author).  The Commission is 
currently working on attempt number five, the Home Foreclosure Procedures Act, which unlike previous 
attempts does not chose non-judicial foreclosure over judicial foreclosure.  Id. at 2.  Instead, it attempts to allow 
both to continue.  See id.  The process seems destined for failure as well.  In December 2014, the American 
Bankers Association wrote a letter to the chair of the committee stating that “no banker and no state bankers 
association has told ABA that they want this bill.”  Id. at 7.  It then goes on to say that the American Bankers 
Association prefers state-by-state attempts at reform.  See id. 
 90. Id.; Nelson, supra note 75, at 15–16. 
 91. Nelson, supra note 75, at 20. 
 92. Id. at 22. 
 93. See Aaron Byrkit, Reforming Foreclosure Disposition: A Tool for Tempering the Financial 
Meltdown, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. REV. 275 (2009) (endorsing the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act); David 
M. Madway & Daniel D. Pearlman, Mortgage Forms and Foreclosure Practices: Time For Reform, 9 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 560 (1974) (advocating for the Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act); Basil H. Mattingly, 
The Shift From Power to Process: A Functional Approach to Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77 (1996) 
(calling for an approach that combines elements of non-judicial and strict foreclosure); Nelson, supra note 75; 
Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 
DUKE L.J. 1399 (2004) (endorsing the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act); Vaughan, supra note 37 (calling 
for a return to strict foreclosure). 
 94. See Karen Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 177, 177 (2003); Cem Demiroglu, Evan Dudley & Christopher James, State Foreclosure Laws and the 
Incidents of Mortgage Default, 57 J.L. & ECON. 280, 228 (citing Citibank data, he claimed foreclosure costs 
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to the homeowner, if you simply look at the process costs, judicial foreclosure 
is more expensive than non-judicial foreclosure.  It is logical to prefer the 
cheaper over the more expensive; but we have all heard the adage “you get what 
you pay for.”  While a simpler and cheaper process for the lenders may sound 
compelling, it is only part of the story.  The proper comparison is not between 
the cost of non-judicial versus judicial foreclosure.  The proper comparison 
should be between the cost of foreclosing or not foreclosing on a home. 
A.  The Effect on Housing Prices 
Besides claiming non-judicial foreclosure is cheaper for lenders, the 
industry also claims that it is cheaper for prospective home borrowers.  Here is 
where the story becomes much more complex.  Numerous studies have tried to 
determine whether judicial foreclosure really adds costs for both borrowers and 
lenders.  Karen Pence conducted one such study.  Pence studied home loans 
originating in 1994 and 1995 in counties bordering state lines, where one 
county was in a judicial foreclosure state and one was in a non-judicial 
foreclosure state.95  She looked at approved mortgage applications in an attempt 
to ascertain if state law affects a consumer’s ability to obtain a mortgage.96  She 
estimated that “loan sizes are 3% to 7% smaller in states that require judicial 
foreclosure processes.”97  This has led to industry claims that judicial 
foreclosure harms home buyers by limiting the size of available mortgages.  
Pence’s explanation of her results is important and rarely acknowledged.  She 
explained that in judicial foreclosure states: 
borrowers may pay more for their mortgages, purchase smaller houses, or have 
difficulty becoming homeowners.  But borrowers are not necessarily worse off; 
they may value the insurance provided by the laws.  Homeownership might even 
increase if judicial requirements help borrowers remain in their homes.98 
There are several other important things to remember about the Pence 
study.  It was done using data from 1994 and 1995, hardly a time of stress for 
the housing markets.  It was pre-subprime boom and also before the explosion 
in securitization.  Frankly, it was a completely different housing market. 
More recently, Mian, Sui, and Trebbi examined a sample of foreclosures 
 
average “$3,112 in judicial review states versus $2,269 in states without judicial review”).  Numerous studies 
over the years have documented that lenders’ costs are higher in judicial states.  See Brian Ciochette, Loss 
Characteristics of Commercial Mortgage Foreclosures, 14 REAL EST. FIN. 53 (1997); Anthony Pennington-
Cross, Subprime & Prime Mortgages: Loss Distributions (OFHEO, Working Paper No. 03–1, 2004), available 
at http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Research/PaperDocuments/2003-05_WorkingPaper_03-
1_N508.pdf. 
 95. Pence, supra note 94, at 179. 
 96. Id. at 177.  She controlled for a number of factors that might affect her results, such as the census 
characteristics of the residents, property tax, and age of housing stock.  Id. at 179. 
 97. Pence, supra note 94, at 180.  There are two versions of this study available.  In the first, published 
online in 2003, she found a four-to-six percent increase.  Id. at 177.  Because her conclusions were slightly 
different in each, and because the later version appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, I am relying on the later 
version of the study. 
 98. Pence, supra note 94, at 182.  
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from 2006 to 2010 to determine whether the difference between judicial and 
non-judicial foreclosure laws affected housing prices. 99  They found that 
lenders were “twice as likely to foreclose” on a home in a non-judicial state, 
despite the fact that default rates in non-judicial and judicial states were nearly 
identical.100  Their study documented that the increased rate of foreclosure was 
responsible for “20 to 30% of the decline in house prices” from 2007 to 2009.101  
Non-judicial foreclosure is directly contributing to the devaluing of the housing 
market.  More interestingly, they specifically addressed the results of Pence’s 
study and found that “during the 1990s there [was] some evidence of higher 
credit supply to states with no judicial foreclosure requirement.  But by the late 
1990s into the 2000s, there [was] no evidence that lenders [were] willing to 
lend higher amounts in states with no judicial foreclosure requirement.”102 
B.  The Effect on Interest Rates 
Another common reason cited in support of non-judicial foreclosure is 
that, because it is less costly for the lender, the interest rates charged to 
customers are correspondingly reduced.  Despite a very aggressive search, I 
could find only one study to support this claim.103  The applicability of this 
study is suspect, however, because it is more than twenty years old and was 
examining the interest rate differentials in regions in a period when “15 to 20 
% of all residential mortgages” were being sold by their originator.104  In 2013, 
that number was approximately 59 percent.105  The pooling of the mortgages 
may reduce the cost of default on any one mortgage, making it less necessary 
to price the mortgages based on whether there is judicial foreclosure.106 
A more recent study found “no evidence that judicial foreclosure 
requirements lead to higher mortgage interest rate quotes.”107  In fact, it found 
that judicial states actually “exhibit marginally lower effective mortgage rate 
quotes than similar products” in judicial states.108  While they did find that 
lenders charged a bit less in states that allowed deficiency judgments than states 
that do not, the difference only translated into an additional ten dollars per 
 
 99. Atif Mian, Amir Sui, & Francesco Trebbi, Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy 
(2014), available at, 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=housing_law_and_policy. 
 100. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). 
 101. Id. at 4.  For further discussion of the effects of foreclosure on housing prices, see infra pp. 28–30. 
 102. Id. at 26–27. 
 103. Mark Meader, The Effects of Mortgage Law on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143, 146 
(1982) (finding that judicial foreclosure added 11.09 basis points to a 1000 basis point rate). 
 104. Id. at 144. 
 105. The Role of the Secondary Market in Mortgage Financing, Bipartisan Policy Center, 2 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/SecondaryMarket-final.pdf. 
 106. David M. Harrison & Michael J. Seiler, The Paradox of Judicial Foreclosure: Collateral Value 
Uncertainty and Mortgage Rates, J. REAL EST. FIN. ECON. 1, 33 (2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract+2234639.  The study used loan data from 26,892 applicants from 2011 in both judicial 
and non-judicial states. 
 107. Id. at 28. 
 108. Id. at 25. 
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month per mortgage.109  In fact, the evidence suggested that lenders are aware 
of the costs of judicial foreclosure so they reacted to these externalities by 
securitizing “a higher fraction of new loans originated in judicial foreclosure” 
states, thereby avoiding the risk.110  Therefore, there really is no strong 
empirical evidence that judicial foreclosure increases interest rates for 
borrowers in any significant way.  As the market has become more uniform, 
lenders appear to be eliminating any rate differences between judicial and non-
judicial states through securitization.111 
C.  The Cost of Delay 
The final argument against judicial foreclosure is that it simply takes too 
long and, by virtue of that delay, harms lenders, borrowers, and communities.  
Numerous studies have documented the fact that judicial foreclosure takes 
longer than non-judicial foreclosure.112  The trick is to determine the actual 
harm and then craft a remedy to address that harm without causing other, 
different harms.  It is not so obvious that the only solution to a foreclosure crisis 
is a more rapid foreclosure process. 
In their study, Cordell, Geng, Goodman, and Yang, attempted to set out 
the specific lender costs caused by a delayed foreclosure process.113  They 
examined three costs: property taxes that the lender must continue to pay; 
homeowner’s insurance that the lender must continue to pay; and the cost of 
excess depreciation, based on the assumption that homeowners in foreclosure 
do not maintain their property.114  What is both interesting and puzzling about 
this study is they chose a period of time deliberately because it included two 
forced foreclosure moratoria: the first was instituted by Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae and the second was caused by the “robo-signing” scandal.115  They also 
examined the effects of the introduction of HAMP in 2009 and the Attorneys 
General Settlement of 2012.116  Frankly, this was a very anomalous time period. 
They found that foreclosure took an average of six months longer in 
judicial states, a period slightly longer than previous studies.117  Considering 
 
 109. Id at 2. 
 110. Id at  33. 
 111. See also Terrence M. Clauretie, The Impact of Interstate Foreclosure Cost Differences and the Value 
of Mortgages on Default Rates, 15 AREUEA J. 152 (1987) (giving more evidence that the cost of foreclosing is 
not being reflected in mortgage rates).  But see Milonas Kristoffer, The Effect of Foreclosure Laws on 
Securitization: Evidence from U.S. 4 (2014), available at https://www.eurofidai.org/.Milonas 2014.pdf (finding 
evidence that loans are less likely to be privately securitized in judicial states). 
 112. See Terrence M. Clauretie, State Foreclosure Laws, Risk Shifting, & the PMI Industry, 56 J. OF RISK 
& INS. 544 (1989) (finding that judicial foreclosure took five months longer than nonjudicial foreclosure); 
Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence 
from the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 221 (1990) (same). 
 113. Larry Cordell et al., FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., The Cost of Delay (2013). 
 114. Id. at 13. 
 115. See generally id.; see also id. at 27. 
 116. See generally id. 
 117. Id. at 7. 
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that the “robo-signing” moratoria was effective only in judicial foreclosure 
states it is surprising that the differential was not larger.  What is disappointing 
about this study is that Cordell and his colleagues then jumped to the conclusion 
that longer foreclosure periods would “get passed on to ALL homeowners, in 
the form of higher rates on their new mortgages” with absolutely no data to 
support that conclusion.118 
Their statement appears to be a response to the Federal Finance Housing 
Agency’s (FHFA) announcement of December 9, 2013 that it would be 
charging an increased fee to loans in states where “foreclosure carrying costs 
are more than two standard deviations greater than the national average.”119  
The increased timelines in order to complete a foreclosure in certain states 
motivated the rule.  While the decision was unfortunate and even misguided, it 
hardly applies to all homeowners. 
The delineated states—New Jersey, New York, and Florida—are very 
good examples of why complaints about the length of the foreclosure process 
should not be taken at face value.120  At last count, these three states have the 
three longest average timelines to complete a foreclosure—1098, 939 and 925 
days, respectively.  They also have the three highest numbers of zombie 
mortgages according to a recently released report by RealtyTrac.121  A 
“zombie” mortgage is a foreclosure in which the homeowner abandoned the 
home believing it was lost in foreclosure, but the lender never completed the 
foreclosure or took possession of the property.122  The two statistics are 
intrinsically linked.  Abandoned foreclosures caused by lender inaction are 
artificially inflating the foreclosure timelines. 
There are many possible explanations for the increased numbers of 
“zombie” mortgage in these three states.  In a previous paper, I documented 
four subsets of zombie loans found in judicial foreclosure states: (1) the 
foreclosure was commenced and then dismissed unresolved (no cure and no 
sale), (2) the foreclosure was commenced and simply abandoned with no 
further action, (3) a foreclosure judgment was entered, but no sale occurred, 
and (4) a judgment was entered, no sale occurred and the judgment was later 
 
 118. Id. at 14. 
 119. FHFA Takes Further Steps to Advance Conservatorship Strategic Plan by Announcing an Increase 
in Guarantee Fees, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Takes-Further-Steps-to-Advance-Conservatorship-
Strategic-Plan-by-Announcing-an-Increase-in-Guarantee-Fees.aspx.  The affected states are New York, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and Florida.  Id. 
 120. One in Four U.S. Foreclosures are “Zombies” Vacated By Homeowner, Not Yet Repossessed by 
Foreclosing Lender, REALTYTRAC, (Feb. 5, 2015) http://www.realtytrac.com/news/foreclosure-trends/zombie-
foreclosures-q1-2015/. 
 121. U.S. Foreclosure Decreases 2 Percent in June to Lowest Level Since July 2006, Before Housing 
Bubble Burst, REALTYTRAC (July 2014), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/june-
and-midyear-2014-us-foreclosure-market-report-8111. 
 122. Judith Fox, The Foreclosure Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures are Re-entering the Market 
through Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 25, 31 (2013). 
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vacated by the lender.123  Lenders appear to abandon foreclosures for a variety 
of reasons.  Several studies have attempted to show that homeowners may be 
more likely to default if they owe more on the home than it is worth.124  In her 
study of abandoned properties in Newark, New Jersey, Professor Linda Fisher 
found that 37 percent of the properties had been abandoned by both the 
homeowner and the lender, suggesting that home value may have contributed 
to the abandonment.125  Some properties may not be worth the cost of the 
foreclosure; but if that were the only cause of the long timelines it hardly makes 
sense for the industry to complain. 
A closer look at what has happened in New Jersey, however, suggests 
other reasons for the delays.  Daren Bloomquist of RealtyTrac claims the 
foreclosure backlog in New Jersey is due to “litigation, legislation and 
mitigation.”126  The backlog is largely a result of abandoned foreclosures and 
lender misconduct in the foreclosure process.127  In 2010, Chief Justice Rabner, 
concerned about reports of shoddy paperwork being filed in New Jersey courts, 
helped enact a court rule that mandates attorneys who file foreclosure 
complaints to communicate with their client to determine that the information 
in the filed documents is accurate and based on an actual inspection of the 
record.128  It is true that the rule caused foreclosure filings to fall from 58,445 
in 2010 to 11,037 in 2011.129  However, this is hardly the fault of the judicial 
system.  What it proves—if it proves anything—is that in New Jersey, prior to 
2010, lenders were filing foreclosures based on inaccurate documentation.  The 
 
 123. Id. at 31–43. 
 124. Demiroglu, supra note 94, at 228 (finding that negative equity may increase the likelihood of default). 
 125. Linda E. Fisher, Shadowed by the Shadow Inventory: A Newark, New Jersey, Case Study of Stalled 
Foreclosures and Their Consequences, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1265, 1277–78 (2014). 
 126. Joe Light, Foreclosure Backlog Slows Housing Recovery in Some States, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2014, 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/foreclosure-backlog-slows-recovery-in-some-states-141598909; 
Fisher, supra note 125 (looking at a New Jersey-specific study of the issue). 
 127. Joe Tyrell, New Foreclosure Procedures Put to Test as Number of Cases Climbs in New Jersey, 
NJSPOTLIGHT (Feb. 4, 2015), available at http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/15/02/02/new-foreclosure-
procedures-put-to-test-as-number-of-cases-climbs-in-nj/. 
 128. See N.J. SUP. CT. R. 4:64-1.  Foreclosure Complaint, Uncontested Judgment Other Than In Rem Tax 
Foreclosure: 
(a)Title Search; Certifications.  
(1) Prior to filing an action to foreclose a mortgage, a condominium lien, or a tax lien to which 
R. 4:64-7 does not apply, the plaintiff shall receive and review a title search of the public 
record for the purpose of identifying any lienholder or other persons and entities with an 
interest in the property that is subject to foreclosure and shall annex to the complaint a 
certification of compliance with the title search requirements of this rule. 
(2) In all residential foreclosure actions, plaintiff’s attorney shall annex to the complaint a 
certification of diligent inquiry: 
(A) that the attorney has communicated with an employee or employees of the plaintiff 
who (i) personally reviewed the documents being submitted and (ii) confirmed their 
accuracy; and 
(B) the name(s), title(s) and responsibilities in those titles of the plaintiff’s employee(s) 
with whom the attorney communicated pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) of this rule. 
(3) Plaintiff’s attorney shall also annex to the complaint a certification, executed by the 
attorney, attesting that the complaint and all documents annexed thereto comport with the 
requirements of R. 1:4-8(a). 
 129. Tyrell, supra note 127. 
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lenders were unable to produce accurate documentation when required and, as 
a result, stopped filing foreclosure actions.  The fact that a lender is unable to 
meet its burden to honestly and accurately document its right to foreclosure is 
not the same as judicial-driven delay.130 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) was a contributing 
factor in the paperwork problems across the country, but this was especially 
true in in Florida.131  MERS was created by the industry (largely the GSEs) to 
ease the transfer of paper in the buying and selling of mortgages.132  
Unfortunately, MERS did not operate in the manner intended and numerous 
paperwork problems resulted.133  Studies of Florida foreclosures show that 
involvement by MERS made it more likely the loan would end up as a “zombie” 
loan.134  In addition, a substantial number of foreclosures in Florida were 
handled by the Stern Law Office.  This law firm handled the bulk of the GSEs’ 
filings in the state.135  Unfortunately for everyone, these foreclosures were 
handled by fraudulently recreating documents and the robo-signing of 
affidavits.136  The firm eventually closed and Mr. Stern was disbarred; but not 
until hundreds of thousands of foreclosure cases had been mishandled.137  This 
at least suggests that the long foreclosure timelines and high rate of “zombie” 
loans in Florida are partially related to the industry’s failure to properly handle 
its paperwork.  It is ironic that the GSEs have raised the cost of home ownership 
in Florida because of the delays in foreclosure, many of which are the direct 
result of the system they created and the lawyer they hired to administer it.138 
The situation in New York is similar.  In 2010, New York’s Chief Judge 
Lippman ordered all foreclosure attorneys to certify that their paperwork was 
accurate.139  In New York City alone, this caused 4450 foreclosure cases to be 
stalled.140  It is likely that many of these foreclosures have joined the list as 
 
 130. For a discussion of what lenders need to establish in order to foreclose, see Renaurt, supra note 32. 
 131. Alan M. White, Losing the Paper-Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 
24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 486 (2012) [hereinafter White, Losing the Paper]; see also COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 407; Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgager Electronic 
Registration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111 (2011). 
 132.  White, Losing the Paper, supra note 131, at 486 (2012); David H. Carpenter, Cong. Research Serv., 
R41491, “Robo-Signing” and Other Alleged Documentation Problems in Judicial and Nonjudicial Foreclosure 
Processes (2010) at 6–7. 
 133. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 407. 
 134. White, Losing the Paper, supra note 131, at 486. 
 135. Todd Ruger, Top Florida Foreclosure Lawyer Shuts Down Firm, HERALD TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2011), 
available at http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20110307/WIRE/110309587. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Kimberly Miller, Florida Supreme Court Disbars Foreclosure King David J. Stern, PALM BEACH 
POST (Jan, 9, 2014), available at http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/business/real-estate/fla-supreme-
court-disbars-foreclosure-king-david-j/nchLs/. 
 138. See id. 
 139. David B. Caruso & Alan Zibel, New York Judge Orders Foreclosure Lawyers Held Accountable for 
Accuracy of Paperwork, HUFFINGTON POST (December 20, 2010) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/20/new-york-judge-orders-for_n_770798.html. 
 140. Robert Gearty, Dubious signatures, missing, inaccurate paperwork halt 4,450 city foreclosures, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 24, 2010), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/dubious-signatures-
missing-inaccurate-paperwork-halt-4-450-city-foreclosures-article-1.187597. 
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“zombie” loans. 
The delays the industry wants to blame on judicial procedure are really 
the result of lender malfeasance.  Eliminating the need for a plaintiff to prove 
its case should never be the basis for accelerating the foreclosure process.  With 
no other compelling rationale, the lending industry’s argument in support of 
faster foreclosure devolves into an argument that, because it is too burdensome 
to prove the right to foreclose, states should not require it.  It is also an 
acknowledgement that in states that make foreclosing parties produce valid 
paperwork, foreclosure takes longer.  The length of time for the foreclosure to 
be completed is the price we pay for due process.  It is a price worth paying. 
D.  The Role of Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy proceedings are another reason that reported foreclosure 
timelines can be deceiving.  In non-judicial states, homeowners appear to use 
bankruptcy proceedings as a substitute for state judicial process.141  
Homeowners facing foreclosure usually file for bankruptcy relief under either 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code.142  Either will temporarily stay 
the foreclosure proceeding, but a Chapter 13 is often preferable for a 
homeowner wishing to maintain possession of the home.143  A Chapter 13 
bankruptcy provides a mechanism to cure the default over the life of the 
bankruptcy plan.144  In their study, White and Reid found that bankruptcy 
protection is more useful in preventing foreclosures in non-judicial states.145  
This makes sense in that a bankruptcy proceeding may provide some of the 
oversight that a non-judicial procedure lacks.  However, White and Reid 
ultimately concluded that during the recent crisis, bankruptcy acted more as a 
delay than a cure to the foreclosure.146  Mortgage modification was more 
successful than bankruptcy in curing default.147  While non-judicial foreclosure 
appears more efficient, it may simply be pushing homeowners into bankruptcy, 
a less efficient and more time consuming process. 
IV.  THE COSTS OF FORECLOSURE 
Before moving into the reasons that support judicial foreclosure, it is 
important to evaluate the very concept of “foreclosure” as something to be 
 
 141. See Alan M. White & Carolina Reid, Saving Homes? Bankruptcy and Loan Modification in the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 65 FLORIDA L. REV. 1713 (2013); Demiroglu, supra note 94, at 231. 
 142. White & Reid, supra note 141, at 1717. 
 143. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2012). 
 144. White & Reid, supra note 141, at 1717–18.  Since the beginning of the crisis, advocates have been 
calling for changes in the Bankruptcy Code that would allow the Trustee to modify mortgage terms in a Chapter 
13 bankruptcy.  For more on this debate, see Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification 
of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 571 (2009). 
 145. White & Reid, supra note 141, at 1715. 
 146. Id. at 1736. 
 147. Id. 
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avoided.  There is a growing consensus that foreclosures cause harm.  As 
President Obama stated in 2009, by investing: 
in foreclosure-prevention today, we will save ourselves the costs of foreclosure 
tomorrow - costs borne not just by families with troubled loans, but by their 
neighbors and communities and our economy as a whole.148 
The debate is whether “harm” is a necessary evil to a vital housing market.  
No one argues that lenders should never be able to foreclose on a loan.  The 
question is whether policy should favor the foreclosure, as it has for the last 
several decades, or whether it should favor homeowners, as advocates have 
been claiming since the onset of this crisis. 
A.  Costs to the Lenders and Investors 
As stated previously, lenders complain that foreclosure costs are too high, 
especially for judicial foreclosure.149  Freddie Mac estimated those costs to be 
$58,759 per loan.150  The extent to which these losses are borne by the lender, 
the investor, or an insurer depends on a number of factors.151  Professor White 
studied records of 32,190 foreclosure sales involving securitized loans and 
estimates investors “lost approximately $4.72 billion” or approximately 
“$146,716” per home.152  While it is logical to claim that lenders also want to 
avoid foreclosure, that is not what is happening in the real world. 
In the real world it is neither the lender nor the investor who is in primary 
contact with the borrower.  It is the servicer.  Servicers do not have the same 
financial incentives to avoid foreclosure that lenders and banks have.153  They 
have to hire and train staff and improve technology; but these are additional 
costs for which they are not compensated.154  Most of the loans were in 
securitized trust governed by Pooling and Servicing Agreements (“PSAs”).  
While most PSAs allow for loan modification, the decisions required a certain 
amount of discretion that the servicers were reluctant to exercise.155  In the end, 
many loans that could have been saved went into foreclosure. 
B.  Foreclosure’s Effects on Property Values 
The cost of an avoidable foreclosure is not just borne by the parties to the 
transaction.  Numerous studies have documented that foreclosures depress 
 
 148. Obama Foreclosure Speech: Housing Plan (FULL TEXT), HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/18/obama-foreclosure-speech_n_167889.html. 
 149. Darryl E. Getter, Cong. Research Serv., RL34232, Understanding Mortgage foreclosure: Recent 
Events, the Process, and Costs (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34232_20071105.pdf. 
 150. Id. at 11. 
 151. For the industry perspective, see MORTG. BANKERS ASSOC., Lenders’ Cost of Foreclosure (May 28, 
2008), http://dcwintonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Lenders-Cost-of-Foreclosure.pdf. 
 152. Justin Wagner, Assisting Distresses Homeowners to Avoid Foreclosures: An Advocate’s Role in an 
Evolving Judicial and Policy Environment, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 423, 434 (2010). 
 153. Cordell, supra note 19, at 2. 
 154. Id. at 15–16. 
 155. Id. at 21–22. 
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surrounding housing prices as well.156  The results are consistent for studies 
done before and after the mortgage crisis that began in 2006.157  As stated 
earlier, at least one very recent study found that the size of the price decline is 
larger in non-judicial foreclosure states than judicial foreclosure states because 
homes are more likely to be foreclosed in non-judicial states.158  The specifics 
about the size of the decline, as well as about the geographic and temporal 
impacts of the decline, differ slightly from study to study, but the overall 
conclusion is consistent: the value of properties located near a foreclosure will 
decrease due to that foreclosure.159  An example of how substantial this impact 
can be in a neighborhood is well-illustrated in a 2011 study of Sacramento, 
California by Robert Wassmer.160 
Wassmer studied the extent of the price depreciation in the selling of non-
real estate owned homes caused by the presence of real estate owned homes.161  
As with other studies, he found that the magnitude of the impact decreased as 
one moves further from the home.162  The decrease in value “averaged $48,827 
per home.”163  This is a shockingly high number, but he acknowledged that the 
magnitude of a price decline this size may be found in only a few other similar 
urban areas.164  That, however, does not diminish the fact that in eighteen 
months he estimated that the City of Sacramento lost $1.1 billion in property 
 
 156. See Elliot Anenberg & Edward Kung, Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to 
Nearby Foreclosures, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 247 (2014) (finding a 1.5 percent drop in home prices for each 
foreclosure listed within 0.1 miles); Charles Calomiris, Stanley D. Longhofer, & William Miles, The 
Foreclosure-House Nexus: Lessons from the 2007-2008 Housing Turmoil, NAT. BUREAU OF ECON. RES., at 25 
(2008), available at www.nber.org/papers/w14294 (finding foreclosure has a “small effect . . . on house 
prices . . . [and] conservatively (over-)estimate that the national average price decline for houses from the 
2007:Q2 peak to 2009:Q4 will be roughly 5.5 percent”).  They then go on to conclude that “a reasonable 
estimate of the future path of U.S. housing market prices is that they will remain essentially flat, on average, 
for the next two years, notwithstanding the large predicted increase in foreclosures.”  Id.; John Y. Campbell, 
Stefano Giglio, & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and Housing Prices, 101 AM. ECON. REV.  2108, 2124 (2011) 
(finding considerable evidence that “foreclosures within 0.25 mile, and particularly within 0.1 mile, lower the 
price at which a house can be sold.”); John Harding, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent W. Yao, The Contagion Effect 
of Foreclosed Properties, 66 J. OF URBAN ECON. 164, 165 (2009) (confirming that nearby foreclosed properties 
have “significant negative contagion effects over and above the local trend in house prices”); Daniel Hartley, 
The Effect of Foreclosures on Nearby Housing Prices: Supply or Dis-Amenty?, 49 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 
108 (2014) (finding that nearby foreclosures depress housing prices by 1.3 percent); Dan  Immergluck & G. 
Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values, 17 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 57 
(2006) (stating that foreclosure within 1/8 of a mile reduces the value of neighboring houses by 1.1 percent); 
Mian, Sui, & Trebbi, supra note 99; Anthony Pennington-Crosse, The Value of Foreclosed Property, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (2004) (discussing a study done before the crisis documenting that prices decline 
in homes near a foreclosure, decreasing as you move away from the sale both in time and distance). 
 157. At least one study raised the possibility that the effects of this price depression may be larger because 
of the number of foreclosures.  Calomiris, supra note 159, at 14.  They took this into account in their model, 
but could neither prove nor disprove it.  At the same time, their predictions of only small housing price drops 
as a result of the crisis proved to be widely inaccurate. 
 158. Mian, Sui, & Trebbi, supra note 99, at 28. 
 159. See supra note 156. 
 160. Robert W. Wassmer, The Recent Pervasive External Effects of Residential Home Foreclosure, 21 
HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 247 (2011). 
 161. See generally id.  An REO (“real estate owned”) is a term that refers to a property, post foreclosure 
sale that has been purchased by the lender. 
 162. Id. at 260. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.. at 261. 
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sales value.165  This was not just a loss to the individuals, it was a huge loss to 
the local property tax base.166  Such a huge loss of revenue must certainly be 
followed by a reduction in municipal services.  Consequently, everyone in 
Sacramento suffered as a result of the foreclosure crisis. 
There are several theories as to why foreclosures depress neighboring 
house prices.  First, it could be a supply problem.  When an unusually large 
number of properties become available because of foreclosure, supply and 
demand theories operate to lower the price of neighboring properties.167  A 
second possibility is that foreclosed properties, because they typically sell for 
less than non-foreclosure properties, depress the appraisal values of 
neighboring, comparable properties used by appraisers.168  Finally, houses in 
foreclosure are likely to be under-maintained, which could “send a negative 
signal to potential buyers about the quality of life and social control in the 
neighborhood.”169  All of these probably interact in some way to create these 
results.  The last of these theories has led to a number of studies on the effects 
of foreclosures on neighborhoods. 
C.  The Contagion Effect 
The contagion effect is the name given to the fact that one foreclosure in 
a neighborhood affects all the neighboring properties the way a virus might 
affect a room full of school children.  As stated earlier, it is fairly well 
established that foreclosures depress the value of other homes in the 
neighborhood.170  Properties that do make it to sheriff sale tend to sell for less 
than properties that sell in normal conditions.171  There are several theories for 
why this may be.  It has been suggested that one reason foreclosed properties 
sell for a reduced price is that homeowners fail to maintain homes in 
foreclosure.172  It is also true that there is a small pool of buyers in a foreclosure 
auction and those buyers come in with a different set of expectations about 
price.173  These buyers are more often investors who intend to resell the 
 
 165. Id at 260. 
 166. Id. at 261.  Wassmer also points out that, because of Proposition 13, the community has no ability to 
raise property rates to make up this difference.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 252; see also Hartley, supra note 156, at 116 (discussing that his findings that could be 
explained by over-supply); Mian, Sui, & Trebbi, supra note 99, at 30 (finding “foreclosure-induced increase in 
supply” depresses neighboring house prices). 
 168. Wassmer, supra note 160, at 252.  The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice do not 
require this, but has said, in response to questions, “[t]here are many appraisal assignments where, in order to 
achieve credible results, it is necessary to use ‘distress’ (e.g., REO or Short Sales) properties as comparable 
sales.”  ASB Issues June 2011 USPAP Q&A, APPRAISAL NEWS (June 15, 2011), http://appraisal-
news.com/2011/06/asb-issues-june-2011-uspap-qa/. 
 169. Wassmer, supra note 160, at 252. 
 170. See supra note 156. 
 171. John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House Prices, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 2108, 2129 (2011) (finding that homes sold in foreclosure sold at a 27 percent discount). 
 172. See Anenberg, supra note 156, at 2550 (finding that in high-density neighborhoods the lack of 
maintenance of homes in foreclosure contributes to lower property values). 
 173. John P. Harding, Eric Rosenblatt, & Vincent W. Yao, The Foreclosure discount: Myth or reality?, 
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property, as opposed to prospective homeowners who intend to occupy the 
property after the sale.  This difference creates an expectation in the buyer that 
he should be able to purchase the property at a discount.174  Often, the only 
buyer at the auction is the lender.175  One study found that when the lender buys 
and then resells a foreclosed home, it sells the home at a loss between 72 percent 
and 90 percent of the time.176 
The contagion effect is not only felt in housing costs.  Mian, Sui, and 
Trebbi found that as housing prices drop, so does overall residential 
investment.177  There is little incentive to build in areas with shrinking home 
values.  Their results were more pronounced in non-judicial states because, as 
mentioned earlier, non-judicial states had more foreclosures relative to their 
default rates.178  Interestingly, their evidence suggests that it is not only 
housing-related consumer spending that suffers as a result of foreclosed 
properties in the neighborhood; other consumer spending also falls.179  For 
example, they found that auto sales from 2008 to 2010 “were 5 to 10% lower 
in non-judicial versus judicial states.”180  Their study suggests that foreclosures 
have far-reaching effects on the economy in general and not just on local 
housing prices.181 
Foreclosures have also been blamed for other societal ills.  The results are 
mixed as to whether the contagion effect of decreasing housing prices also 
increases crime in an area.  One theory is that the physical disorder caused by 
foreclosure affects the social order and that as social order decreases, crime 
increases.182  Several previous studies had suggested that vacant buildings 
cause a decrease in civil behavior and, as a result, an increase in crime.183  The 
question is whether foreclosures or vacant buildings are the problem.  Most 
studies have found that increased foreclosures do not necessarily correspond to 
a rising level of crime.184  To the extent that foreclosures cause vacant buildings 
and vacant buildings increase crime, there is clearly some connection between 
foreclosure increases and increases in crime.  This relationship, however, is still 
not well understood. 
 
71 J. OF URB. ECON. 204, 206 (2012). 
 174. Id. at 205. 
 175. Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of Fairness and Efficiency of 
Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 663 (1997). 
 176. Id. at 663–64. 
 177. Mian, Sui, & Trebbi, supra note 99, at 22. 
 178. Id. at 2. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 22. 
 181. Id. at 30. 
 182. Roderick W. Jones & William Alex Pridemore, The Foreclosure Crisis and Crime: Is Housing-
Mortgage Stress Associated with Violent and Property Crime in U.S. Metropolitan Areas?, 93 SOC. SCI. Q.672, 
673 (2012). 
 183. See William Spelman, Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime, 21 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 481 (1993); 
James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 27 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 29 (1982). 
 184. Jones, supra note 182, at 674, 683. 
8 FOX FORMATTED_7.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2015  3:59 PM 
2015] The Future of Foreclosure Law  511 
 
Research is just beginning to emerge on other negative implications of 
foreclosure.  A recent study by Jason Houle looked at whether “living in high 
foreclosure localities is associated with residents’ mental health.”185  Several 
previous studies had shown an association between foreclosure and worsening 
mental health.186  As Houle pointed out, this foreclosure crisis hit hardest in 
disadvantaged communities.  These same communities were already dealing 
with a number of social inequities and are now experiencing a disproportionate 
number of mental health issues as a result of the current foreclosure crisis.187  
The lost tax revenue caused by the foreclosure crisis has exacerbated the 
problem because it has also resulted in cuts to programs that could provide 
needed services in these communities.  In my own small foreclosure defense 
practice, we have seen numerous people experiencing depression—and one 
suicide—because of their mortgage foreclosures.188  These costs cannot be 
quantified. 
V.  THE CASE FOR LOAN MODIFICATION 
The case for the harm of foreclosure is certainly made.  But that does not 
translate into an argument for judicial foreclosure unless judicial foreclosure 
can somehow prevent foreclosure.  Simply moving to judicial foreclosure will 
not end foreclosure, nor should it.  However, there is at least some evidence 
that it will decrease the number of foreclosures.189  Research suggests that 
living in a judicial foreclosure state increases the likelihood of receiving a loan 
modification.190  Other studies have shown borrowers in states with a slow 
foreclosure process are more likely to cure their default.191 
Loss mitigation is clearly an important part of any ongoing foreclosure 
policy.  It is now required by federal law for most loans.192  Researchers have 
 
 185. Jason N. Holue, Mental Health in the Foreclosure Crisis, 118 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1 (2014). 
 186. Id. at 2 (citing D. E. Alley et al., Mortgage Delinquency and Changes in Access to Health Resources 
and Depressive Symptoms in Nationally Representative Cohort of Americans Older Than 50 Years, 101 AM J. 
PUB. HEALTH 2293 (2011); J. Currie and E. Tekin, Is There a Link Between Foreclosure and Health? (2014), 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~jcurrie/publications/Foreclosure_Health_Jan_2014.pdf; K. A. 
McLaughlin et al., Home Foreclosure and Risk of Psychiatric Morbidity During the Recent Financial Crisis, 
42 PSYCHOL. MED. 1441 (2012); T. L. Osypuk, The Consequences of Foreclosure for Depressive 
Symptomatology, 22 ANN. EPIDEMIOL. 379 (2012)). 
 187. Houle, supra note 185, at 6. 
 188. I run the Economic Justice Clinic at the Notre Dame Law School.  We represent clients in collection 
actions, primarily foreclosure.  In addition, I act as a facilitator between lenders and homeowners for the Indiana 
Supreme Court in an attempt to negotiate loan modifications.  In these two capacities, I have interacted with 
hundreds of homeowners since the crisis began. 
 189. Mian, Sui, & Trebbi, supra note 99, at 10 (finding that “[t]he 13 states with the highest foreclosure 
to delinquent account ratios all allow non-judicial foreclosure).  It is possible, however, that this differential 
will be irrelevant if all states have the same system.  It is not possible to know if foreclosures will decrease in 
non-judicial states or rise in judicial ones. 
 190. J. Michael Collins, Ken Lam, & Christopher E Herbert, State Mortgage Foreclosure Policies and 
Lender Interventions: Impacts on Borrower Behavior in Default, 30 J. POLICY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 216, 226 
(2011). 
 191. Id. at 219. 
 192. Reg. X., C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)–(j). 
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begun to look at loan modifications in the context of the crisis.  This research 
documents the reverse incentives of loan servicing.  We know that loan 
modification is also more likely if the loan is held by the original lender.193  
This is consistent with the understanding that lenders lose money in foreclosure.  
Securitized loans are less likely to be modified, but GSE-securitized loans are 
more likely to be modified.194  Both of these statistics lend credibility to the 
argument that servicers are still claiming servicer restrictions, even though we 
know such restrictions do not exist.195  Recent research has also documented 
that servicers strategically “lost” paperwork on low risk borrowers in an effort 
to steer them away from HAMP modifications into more expensive proprietary 
modifications.196 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) recently enacted 
regulations requiring a servicer to reach out to homeowners within fifteen days 
of a second missed payment.197  The rules do not require any specific loss 
mitigation options, just that loss mitigation be attempted.198  The U.S. 
Department of the Treasury currently monitors and reports on the status of loan 
modifications through its Making Homes Affordable Program.  This program 
is scheduled to end soon, and the future of loan modifications once it expires is 
uncertain.199 
A recent study by J. Michael Collins and Carly Urban suggests that simply 
by continuing its monitoring, the Treasury could improve the incidence of loan 
modifications.200  The study looks at the situation in Maryland, arguably a non-
judicial foreclosure state.  In 2008 Maryland began requiring state-level loan 
servicers to report monthly on their efforts to assist homeowners.201  No 
specific results were required, nor were there any sanctions for 
noncompliance.202  Nonetheless, the study showed that the servicers behaved 
differently for homeowners in Maryland than for similar homeowners in 
neighboring states without the rule.203  The only difference between the states 
was that, in Maryland, someone was monitoring the loss mitigation process.  It 
 
 193. Been, supra note 19, at 3961. 
 194. Id. 
 195. McCoy, supra note 8, at 761–62. 
 196. John A. Karikari, Why Homeowners’ Documentation Went Missing Under the Home Affordable 
Mortgage Program (HAMP)?: An Analysis of Strategic Behavior of Homeowners and Services, 22 J. HOUS. 
ECON. 146, 154 (2013). 
 197. Reg. X., 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41.  The lender cannot initiate foreclosure, however, until the homeowner 
is 120 days delinquent and any loan modification process is complete. 
 198. Id. 
 199. As of the writing of this article, the HAMP program has been extended to December 31, 2015.  
Obama Administration Extends Deadline for Making Homes Affordable Program, May 30, 2013, available at 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/about-mha/latest-news/Pages/Obama-Administration-Extends-
Deadline-for-Making-Home-Affordable-Program.aspx. 
 200. J. Michael Collins & Carly Urban, The Dark Side of Sunshine: Regulatory Oversight and Status Quo 
Bias, 107 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 470 (2014). 
 201. Id. at 471. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id at 485. 
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is possible, therefore, that the very fact that the CFPB will continue monitoring 
compliance with the loss mitigation process may motivate lenders to make 
substantive decisions as well.  It is even more important, however, that state 
programs continue their supervision.204 
During the foreclosure crisis, many states enacted foreclosure mediation 
programs.205  These programs have been wildly successful.206  Unfortunately 
for homeowners, the Mortgage Bankers Association has been aggressively 
seeking to end these programs, often with inaccurate information about the pre-
emptive effect of the CFPB regulations.207  The loss mitigation regulations are 
not pre-empted by the Dodd-Frank legislation; nor, frankly, are the processes 
in state mediation programs duplicative of the process required by the 
regulations.208  Unfortunately, many of the same issues that have plagued loss 
mitigation are still prevalent in the system.  The CFPB is able to monitor on a 
systematic, but not a case by case, basis.  The state-based programs can assist 
on an individual loan level, assuring that all measures have been taken to 
prevent the foreclosure, if possible.  As the Maryland study documents, this 
loan level scrutiny is essential to ensure good outcomes for homeowners. 
The future of loan modification is still unclear.  Two arguments are most 
commonly made by opponents of loan modification.  The first is that they 
simply do not work.  The claim is that loan modifications have high default 
rates and do not prevent the ultimate foreclosure.209  The second is that the very 
idea of a loan modification will create moral hazard in the marketplace.210 
 
 204. See REBUILDING AMERICA, supra note 11, at 12–20 (providing additional rationale for state 
monitoring). 
 205. Id. (providing an overview of state programs). 
 206. Id. at 21. 
 207. As of the writing of this document, the Mortgage Bankers Association has successfully lobbied to 
end mortgage mediation in Michigan (on the grounds of pre-emption) and in Connecticut (on the grounds of 
cost savings).  Efforts are underway in Oregon, Maine and Indiana. 
 208. BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 12 C.F.R. Parts 1024 and 1026 [Docket 
No. CFPB-2013-0010] RIN 3170-AA37 Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules under the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedure Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection. ACTION: Final rule; official interpretations. 
Because the Bureau continued to receive questions on this issue, the Bureau believed it was 
appropriate to propose commentary to clarify the scope of proposed § 1024.5(c) and expressly 
address concerns about field preemption. Consistent with the preamble to the 2013 RESPA 
Servicing Final Rule, proposed comment 5(c)(1)-1 stated that State laws that are in conflict with the 
requirements of RESPA or Regulation X may be preempted by RESPA and Regulation X. Proposed 
comment 5(c)(1)-1 stated further that nothing in RESPA or Regulation X, including the provisions 
in subpart C with respect to mortgage servicers or mortgage servicing, should be construed to 
preempt the entire field of regulation of the covered practices. This proposed addition to the 
commentary was meant to clarify that RESPA and Regulation X do not effectuate field preemption 
of States’ regulation of mortgage servicers or mortgage servicing. The comment also made clear that 
RESPA and Regulation X do not preempt State laws that give greater protection to consumers than 
do these federal laws. 
Id. 
 209. See, e.g., Gerardi, supra note 59. 
 210. See Rojhat Berdan Avsar, Foreclosure Crisis and Innovative Policy Responses: A Constructive 
Critique, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES.155, 158 (2014). 
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A.  The Failures of Loan Modification 
The more pervasive of the two arguments is that loan modifications 
simply do not work.  The problem with that conclusion is that it is based largely 
on data from the very beginning of the crisis when loan modifications were not 
really loan modifications.211  The loan modifications given at the beginning of 
the crisis most often increased a borrower’s payments.212  Lenders often 
demanded upfront fees and onerous waivers of future consumer rights.213  A 
bad loan modification is worse than no modification, but the fact that servicers 
were only offering bad modifications is not an argument against all 
modifications. 
Things changed, albeit gradually, with the introduction of the HAMP 
program in 2009.214  The program is running more efficiently and with better 
outcomes.  The most recent HAMP program performance report shows an 
increase in permanent loan modifications and improved re-default rates.215  
Some problems with HAMP remain.216  The paperwork is confusing and 
repetitive; and the program guidelines are complex and ever changing.217  
Servicers are still rejecting applications for very minor issues.218  Accounting 
rules and the presence of second lienholders hamper the process.219  Silly policy 
decisions still prevent homeowners and lenders from making the best decisions.  
For example, a homeowner cannot explore more than one loss mitigation option 
at any one time.  He must choose to either sell the home or apply for a loan 
modification.  If he takes the time to sell the home, he loses the opportunity to 
apply for a loan modification.  If he applies for a loan modification and does 
not qualify, he has wasted months in which he may have sold the property. 
 
 211. Gerardi, supra note 59 (looking at data from 2005–2010). 
 212. White, supra note 8, at 529. 
 213. At the Crossroads: Lessons From the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., at 14 (Jan. 2013) [hereinafter CROSSROADS]. 
 214. Id. at 18. 
 215. MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH THE THIRD QUARTER OF 
2014, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/3Q%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf; see also, Amy Crew Cutts & William A. 
Merrill, Intervention in Mortgage Defaults: Policies and Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, 
FREDDIE MAC WORKING PAPER #08-01, at 15 (Mar. 2008) (claiming an 80 percent five-year success rate for 
Freddie Mac loan modifications). 
 216. McCoy, supra note 8, at 752–70. 
 217. RECLAIMING THE RULES: SOLUTIONS FOR MORTGAGE SERVICING, A REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA 
MONITOR, 7–11 (Sept. 30, 2014), available at 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/mortgage_settlement/06-report-reclaiming-the-rules.pdf 
 218. In my experience facilitating hundreds of settlement conferences between lenders and homeowners 
from 2011 to the present, there are several, silly issues that reappear on a consistent basis.  (1) Improper 
completion of the RMA, the standard form needed to apply for a HAMP loan modification.  It has a section at 
the end of the application that asks for race, ethnicity, and gender.  Many people check off their ethnicity or 
race, but not both, thinking one takes care of the other.  The result is an “incomplete application,” with no 
explanation about what is incomplete.  (2) Improperly completed 4506T form, the form sent to the IRS to verify 
income.  Applicants must ask for the tax returns for 12/31/2014, not December 31, 2014 or the year 2014 or 
any other variation.  Any variation causes an “incomplete application;” and (3) completion of the wrong form 
(RMA instead of the FHA Form 70) because the homeowner completed what the servicer gave to him to 
complete, but it was wrong.  This too results in an “incomplete application.” 
 219. McCoy, supra note 8, at 765–68. 
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In addition to claiming that loan modifications do not work, lenders also 
claim that they add needless time to the foreclosure process.  They simply delay 
the inevitable.  Again, the evidence does not support the claim.  The State 
Justice Institute did a comprehensive study of Connecticut’s mortgage 
foreclosure mediation program.220  It found that foreclosure cases for eligible 
borrowers who participated in mediation took an average of thirty-five percent 
longer to resolve than those that did not participate in mediation.221  However, 
they also noted that the delays in the process were most often attributed to the 
lenders, not the homeowners.222  “[P]laintiffs (or their attorneys) were more 
likely to be unprepared, to file a continuance, to engage in conduct inconsistent 
with the objectives of the mediation program, not to possess the ability to 
mediate, or not to make an appearance.”223 
This is consistent with my experience as a facilitator for the Indiana 
Mortgage Foreclosure Trial Court Assistance Program.224  Since 2011, I have 
acted as a facilitator for hundreds of settlement conferences between 
homeowners and lenders.  The delays in the process are nearly always caused 
by the servicers.  The problems range from very serious issues such as refusing 
to participate in the conference to the less serious, and more common, problem 
of asking for the same documents multiple times, despite having them in their 
possession.  A review of a random sample of cases from Allen County, Indiana 
revealed that the average time to resolve facilitated cases was essentially the 
same as for non-facilitated cases.225  Most of the delays in the cases occurred 
after the facilitation process had ended.  It can take months for the lender to 
proceed with the foreclosure if there is no settlement and dismiss the case when 
there is a settlement.226  As with the faulty paperwork, the lenders are using a 
delay they have created to argue for the elimination of borrower protections and 
speedier process. 
B.  Moral Hazard 
A second argument against loan modification is that it will create “moral 
 
 220. Gloria Jean Gong & Carl Brinton, Connecticut Judicial Branch Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation 
program Evaluation, STATE JUST. INST. (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/fmp/sji_eval.pdf. 
 221. Id. at 29–30. 
 222. See id. at 30. 
 223. Id. 
 224. For an overview of the program, see Division of State Court Administration, Mortgage Trial Court 
Assistance Project, at https://secure.in.gov/judiciary/admin/2416.htm. 
 225. The average time to complete a cases was 267.9 days for facilitated cases versus 297.6 days for cases 
not facilitated.  In Bartholomew County, a county with many fewer foreclosures, there was a 30 percent increase 
in time to complete a facilitated case, which was roughly equivalent to the three month trial period.  This is 
consistent with the results from Connecticut. Data is on file with the author. 
 226. Some of the delay in dismissing after a settlement may be attributed to the trial modification process 
mentioned previously.  The lender will usually not dismiss until all three trial payments have been made and 
the permanent loan modification is in place.  Even if everything goes perfectly—and it never does—this takes 
four months.  Looking at just the time from filing to completion, this adds at least 120 days, even though the 
homeowner is making payments throughout that time period. 
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hazard.”227  Moral hazard can be described “as carelessness encouraged by 
implicit guarantees (e.g. bailouts).”228  The concern is that if the government 
assists a homeowner who perhaps purchased a home he could not afford or 
signed a loan document without understanding the terms, it will encourage 
others to act in a similarly careless manner in the future.  The industry has been 
trying to present a case for wide-spread strategic default for years.229  Despite 
these efforts, there is no indication that strategic default was a significant player 
in the recent foreclosure crisis.230 
There are a number of problems with these studies.  First, researchers 
typically look at loan-level data and try to guess who has strategically defaulted 
and who has not.231  Many of these data sets are problematic.  For instance, 
LPS, a commonly used data set, does not indicate loan modification at all, so 
some researchers try to guess by determining when the loan became current.232  
The problem with this approach is twofold: (1) as they acknowledge, 
“approximately 4 percent” of the delinquent loans simply disappear, whether 
because they are transferred or other reasons,233 and (2) there has been a 
persistent problem in the industry of not “booking” loan modifications.234 
In order to understand the problem, a homeowner must first understand 
the process for qualifying for a loan modification.  The servicer examines the 
paperwork and determines whether the homeowner qualifies for the loan 
modification, but there is an initial trial period to be sure the owner can sustain 
the payments.  During this trial period, which usually lasts between three-to-
 
 227. McCoy, supra note 8, at 762–63.  The HAMP program specifically thought to deal with the moral 
hazard problem by introducing the NPV, net present value test.  CROSSROADS, supra note 213, at 16.  The 
calculations allowed servicers to calculate whether the lender would benefit more financially from a 
modification or a foreclosure.  Id.  If foreclosure was more profitable, the lender was not required to offer a 
loan modification.  Id. 
 228. Avsar, supra note 210, at 163. 
 229. There are essentially two reasons you would default on your mortgage: (1) you can no longer afford 
to make the payments because of some event like an illness or loss of income, or (2) you are simply unwilling 
to make the payments, according to the industry, “because the home’s value has declined to a level far below 
the outstanding balance on the loan.”  Michael J. Seiler, Vicky L. Seiler, Mark A Lane, & David M. Harrison, 
Fear, Shame and Guilt: Economic and Behavioral Motivations for Strategic Default, 40 REAL EST. ECON. 
S199, S199 (2012).  For further discussion of strategic default, see Fox, supra note 122, at 26–29. 
 230. Foote, Gerardi, Gotte, & Willen, Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers, 24 NBER 
MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 89, 115 (2009), available at jstor.org/stable/a0.10861648289; see also, Michael 
Hiltzik, Inflated Threat of Strategic Default, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2012), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/24/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20120224; Richard DeKaser, “Strategic 
Defaults” less Common than Thought, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080507381.html. 
 231. Seiler, supra note 229, at 231. 
 232. See Gerardi, supra note 59, at 25–26. 
 233. Id. at 26. 
 234. See Karikari, supra note 199; Jacob Adelman, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase: Object of 
Mortgage Lawsuit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-News-Wires/2010/1108/Bank-of-America-JPMorgan-Chase-
object-of-mortgage-lawsuits (reporting on lawsuits filed alleging failure of banks to honor loan modifications); 
David Dayen, Banks Find Appalling New Way to Cheat Homeowners, SALON (Sept. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.salon.com/2013/09/24/banks_find_appalling_new_way_to_cheat_homeowners_partner/ 
(documenting failure to honor loan modifications, especially when servicing is transferred); In re JPMorgan 
Chase Mortgage Modification Litigation, 18 F. Supp. 3d 62, 62 (D. Mass 2014) (final approval of the settlement 
that was reached on Nov. 26, 2013 with relief to homeowners whose loan modifications were not honored). 
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five months, the homeowner makes the new mortgage payment, but the 
homeowner is still considered to be in default.  The loan is not brought current.  
Mega-data would show that this loan is still in default, even though it is in loan 
modification repayment.235  After the trial period the loan modification is 
supposed to become permanent.  Only then will it appear as if the loan is 
current.  Regrettably, loan servicers are notoriously slow in turning the trial 
modifications into permanent modifications on the books.236  Frustrated 
homeowners are told to “just keep making the payments” while the computer 
catches up.  The problem becomes worse for some owners when the loan 
mysteriously disappears when being transferred to a new servicer in the midst 
of a loan modification.237  Multiple lawsuits that have been filed have gotten 
caught up in this trap.  In December 2013, the CFPB announced a multi-billion 
dollar enforcement action against Ocwen, partially related to this issue.238  
Similar litigation with JPMorgan Chase was settled earlier.239  Others are 
pending.  All of this points to the unreliability of loan-level data to determine 
if loan modifications were offered, accepted, or honored.  The data is simply 
not accurate. 
A second problem lies in the assumptions made on the way to the 
conclusions.  One example of a commonly cited study was done by Experian, 
the credit reporting company.240  Its conclusion that a significant number of 
people strategically defaulted during the crisis rests on the assumption that a 
homeowner who is current on some of his credit, but not on his mortgage could 
afford to pay the mortgage and, therefore, has strategically defaulted on the 
mortgage.241  The absurdity of that conclusion is obvious to anyone who has 
worked with actual borrowers during this crisis.  When a homeowner does not 
have enough money to pay all of the bills, it is reasonable that he will decide to 
pay what he can.  Many such borrowers logically choose to pay the car loan 
because they need a car to buy groceries, to go to work, or to look for 
employment.  A borrower’s decision to pay his car loan and not his mortgage 
loan because he cannot afford to pay both is not the same as strategically 
deciding to stop paying the mortgage.  It is impossible to know a borrower’s 
real financial situation simply by looking at a credit report.  The estimates of 
 
 235. Brent T. White, Take This House and Shove it: The Emotional Drivers of Strategic Default, ARIZ. 
LEGAL STUDIES, at 32 (May 2010). 
 236. See Paul Kiel, Homeowners Say Banks Not Following Rules for Loan Modifications, PROPUBLICA 
(Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.propublica.org/article/homeowners-say-banks-not-following-rules-
for-loan-modifications. 
 237. See supra note 234. 
 238. Explainer: What the Multi-Billion Dollar Ocwen Enforcement Action Means for You, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 13, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/explainer-what-the-
multi-billion-dollar-ocwen-enforcement-action-means-for-you/. 
 239. Kiel, supra note 234; JPMorgan Chase Mortgage Modification Litigation, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 62. 
 240. Strategic Default in Mortgages: Q2 2011 Update, EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN MARKET 
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, available at http://www.experian.com/assets/decision-analytics/reports/oliver-
wyman-strategic-default-2011.pdf. 
 241. Id. at 4. 
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strategic default based on such a review overestimate the number of people who 
strategically defaulted on their mortgage. 
Despite the difficulties in doing these studies, several researchers have 
tried to establish why and if people strategically default on their mortgage 
loans.242  Some useful themes have emerged from those studies.  Some 
homeowners defaulted because it was the only way to get assistance.243  Studies 
show that frustrated borrowers are more likely to strategically default on their 
mortgage.244  Some borrowers were angered that help was available for big 
banks and for people who bought a house they cannot afford, but not for them, 
this seems to be the strategic default tipping point..245  Homeowners who have 
a mortgage that exceeds the value of the house and then suffer some additional 
shock such as illness, divorce, or job loss are also more likely to default.246  
But, whether these defaults are strategic is hard to determine.  The only 
emerging consensus from the research is that most people are reluctant to 
default on their mortgage.247 
In the end, we know that large numbers of people defaulted on their 
mortgage during this crisis, whether for economic or strategic reasons.  The real 
question that we should be asking is why was society so reluctant to assist 
homeowners when it was so quick to assist their lenders.  One of the reasons 
seems to be the perception that the government is going to “bail out 
homeowners who made unwise decisions.”248  The willingness of people to 
offer governmental assistance to homeowners in foreclosure seems to be tied 
to the perception of “worthiness”249 or “deservingness.”250 
Researchers have determined that one important aspect of the 
“deservingness” concept is the sense in which the person in need appears to 
lack control over the “cause of the disadvantage.”251  People are less willing to 
assist a person in harm’s way if they perceive that the person needing assistance 
caused or contributed to his own harm.252  People react with anger if they 
 
 242. See, e.g., Brent T. White, supra note 235. 
 243. Id. at 24. 
 244. Id.; see also Seiler, supra note 229, at S221. 
 245. Brent T. White, supra note 235, at 36–40. 
 246. Neil Bhutta, Jane Djjo, & Hui Shan, The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions, 
DIV. OF RES. STATISTICS & MONETARY AFFAIRS FED. RES. BD. FIN. & ECON. at 3 (Discussion Series, Paper No 
2010-34, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf. 
 247. Seiler, supra note 229, at S200–01. 
 248.  Eric Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 AM. ECON. 
REV. 575, 590 (2009), available at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/luigi.zingales/papers/research/a_loan_modification_approach_aler.pdf. 
 249. Several models have been proposed to determine “worth.”  Three useful models, proposed by 
Boltanski and Theveno, are “equality (civic worth), purchasing power (market worth), and competence 
(industrial worth).”Avsar, supra note 210, at 159.  So, “[f]or instance, a given number of computers could 
either be allocated to everyone equally [equality], or be given to those who desire them the most [market], or 
could make the most efficient use of them [competence.].”  Id. 
 250. Mark J. Brandt, Onset and Offset Deservingness: The Case of Home Foreclosures, 34 POL. PSYCHOL. 
221 (2013). 
 251. Id. at 221. 
 252. Seiler, supra note 229, at S222. 
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perceive the person seeking assistance is somehow responsible for the 
circumstance (i.e. home foreclosure) and sympathy if they perceive the result 
as beyond the homeowner’s control.253 
As Seiler points out, the foreclosure crisis has presented an interesting 
opportunity to study the idea of deservingness.  The rhetoric surrounding the 
crisis has been pervasive.  Part of that pervasive rhetoric claims that, by 
allowing some people to modify their mortgage loans, it encourages others to 
“strategically default” in order to also get assistance.  The myth or reality of 
“strategic default” is irrelevant to the analysis. 
Figure 1 illustrates Seiler’s examples of how different perceptions of 
“deserving” and “undeserving” homeowners can drive the willingness or 
unwillingness to assist a homeowner in foreclosure.254  Political leanings can 
also influence a person’s perceptions about deservingness.  Research has 
shown, for example, that “people who endorse conservatism prefer firm 
answers and search for less information.”255  As a result, they are more likely 
to make a deservingness decision based on “onset” and not “offset” 
determinants.256  While the underlying values and norms people used to 
determine deservingness may differ by political leanings, the process appears 
to be the same.257  The research done by Seiler confirms that people of all 
political leanings are willing to assist homeowners in foreclosure if they are 
perceived to be both offset and onset “deserving.”258 
 
 DESERVING ASSISTANCE UNDESERVING ASSISTANCE 
ONSET Deceived into taking out an 
unaffordable loan by 
unscrupulous loan officer259 
Took out an unaffordable 
mortgage260 
OFFSET Lost income because of 
company downsizing261 
Stopped making payments 
because the house is worth more 
than they owe or to get loan 
modification262 
 
What this research suggests is that the rhetoric of the crisis is 
significant.263  How the events are framed will influence how readily people 
 
 253. See id. at S223. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Brandt, supra note 250 at 233. 
 256. See id. at 224. 
 257. See id. at 222. 
 258. See id. at 232.  The onset/offset determiners try to show point in time decisions.  So an onset decision 
is one made before the event, like the decision to take out a mortgage.  An offset determinate is one that happens 
afterwards—for example, my house was worth more than the loan when I took out the loan.  Id. at 222–23. 
 259. Id. at 223. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. The onset/offset determiners try to show point in time decisions.  So an onset decision is one you 
made before the event, like the decision to take out a mortgage.  On offset determinate is one that happens 
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support government intervention.264  One of the problems with early efforts to 
garner support for loan modification was the rhetoric.  The early loan 
modifications were targeted to, and created for, people with variable loans 
scheduled to re-set with higher payments.  The public perceived these as 
programs to assist people who purchased homes they could not afford.  
However, as the economic situation changed and the main driver of foreclosure 
became unemployment, the perception—and support—changed.  Researchers 
began to perceive a growing sense of frustration, even anger that the 
government was willing to “bail out ‘greedy’ Wall Street firms (but not most 
homeowners.)”265  Willingness to assist homeowners seemed to increase as 
they were seen as less deserving of blame than their lenders. 
This research is important because it tells us that, in order to have a 
successful policy change, we must be able to articulate both the onset and offset 
deservingness of those who will benefit.  It also suggests that foreclosure law 
must be seen as protecting those homeowners in situations where they have 
little or no control over the adverse condition that led to foreclosure. 
VI.  THE CASE FOR A POLICY FAVORING HOMEOWNERSHIP 
An honest evaluation of the current body of research reveals one 
significant fact: foreclosure is expensive for all of us.  Clearly, then, we need a 
housing process that minimizes the number of foreclosures and maximizes the 
number of homeowners who are able to remain in their homes.  This does not 
mean that all defaulting homeowners should remain in their homes.  The 
difficult decision is how to craft foreclosure law so as not to incentivize 
homeowners to default and servicers to foreclose. 
The most fundamental reason to favor a judicial process for foreclosure is 
due process.  It is well established law that foreclosure by power of sale does 
not violate the constitutional protection of due process because the power is 
derived from contract and not from state action.266  However, this should not 
diminish the argument that homeowners should have at least as much due 
process protection in protecting their most significant asset, their home, as a 
tenant would have in protecting his tenancy.  Currently, in non-judicial states, 
there is more due process protection in an eviction proceeding than a 
 
afterwards (like my house was worth more than the loan when I took out the loan).  Id. 
 264. Avsar, supra note 210, at 159–60. 
 265. Seiler, supra note 229, at S201. 
 266. See, e.g., Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 
F.2d. 356 (5th Cir. 1977); Northrip v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975); Bullock v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 918 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Miss, 1995); Brantley v. U.S. Bank, N.A, 2013 WL 5429624 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2013); Drake v. Citimortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 1396774 (E.D. Tenn. Apr 13, 2011); Williams 
v. Cheyenne Crossing Residential Ass’n, Inc., 2010 WL 5287509 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2010); Leininger v. 
Merchs. & Farmers Bank,  
Macon , 481 So. 2d 1086 (Miss. 1986); Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1978); Citimortgage 
v. Drake, 410 S.W.3d 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013), appeal denied (Aug. 14, 2013). 
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foreclosure.267  This is absurd.  However, this has been the state of the law for 
many years and state legislators are apparently unconcerned with the absurdity.  
Other arguments must be made. 
One of the peculiar aspects of non-judicial foreclosure is that the entire 
process is in the control of one party, the lender.  On its face it appears that a 
third-party trustee is organizing and holding the sale, but that third-party is 
rarely, if ever, neutral.268  The deed of trust often allows the bank to appoint a 
successor trustee in case of default.  That successor trustee is often a lawyer or 
trust company hired by the bank.269  The system is fraught with conflicts of 
interest.  It is designed to favor foreclosure over home ownership. 
The evidence clearly shows that foreclosures harm everyone, not just the 
person who is losing his or her home.  It is costly to the lender.270  It is costly 
to the neighborhood where other homeowners can expect their property values 
to drop.271  It is costly to the community in increased blight.272  It is in 
everyone’s economic interest to prevent foreclosure.  Foreclosure happens 
more often in non-judicial foreclosure states, despite the default rates.273  
Homeowners are more likely to get a loan modification and less likely to suffer 
a foreclosure in judicial foreclosure states.274  All the data favors a judicial 
foreclosure process. 
The last few years have shown us what can, and does, go wrong in a 
system with no checks and balances.  It has also shown us what can work to 
stem the tide of unnecessary foreclosures.  We will never have one uniform 
foreclosure system in America.  The state property laws are too well ingrained 
in the culture of each state.  However, as federal law encroaches on the area, 
we can have uniformity in some key aspects of the process.  Uniformity is 
something the industry has been requesting for years, so they should be able to 
support a move toward uniform procedures.275  The lesson of this crisis is that 
we need uniformity in three key areas: (1) establishing the right to foreclose; 
(2) loss mitigation and (3) preventing “zombie” mortgages. 
 
 267. Rao, supra note 53, at 11–12.  This is not to endorse the proceedings in eviction hearings.  All of the 
due process rights really depend on the homeowner or tenant’s ability to obtain counsel.  This is a problem in 
both judicial and non-judicial states.  See John Pollock, Lassiter Notwithstanding: The Right to Counsel in 
Foreclosure Actions, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.: J. OF POVERTY LAW & POLICY 448 (2010). 
 268. John Campbell, Can We Trust Trustees? Proposals for Reducing Wrongful Foreclosures, 63CATH. 
U. L. REV. . 103, 129–30 (2013). 
 269. Id. at 130, 133; see also discussion of Holm v. Wells Fargo, infra Part VI.(A). 
 270. See Costs to Lenders and Investors supra Part 27–28. 
 271. See Foreclosure’s Effects on Property Values, supra Part IV(B). 
 272. See Contagion Effect, supra Part IV.(C). 
 273. Mian, Sui, & Trebbi, supra note 99, at 2. 
 274. Collins, supra note 190, at 226. 
 275. Just one example of this can be found in the industry’s support for yet another attempt to draft a 
Uniform Residential Foreclosure Act, a process which began in 2012 and continues today.  Memorandum from 
John A. Sebert, ULC Executive Director, on Report on Stakeholders Meeting Held Jan. 13, 2012 (May 4, 
2012), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%20foreclosure/2012may4_RREMFPP_Stakeholders%20
Meeting%20Report.pdf. 
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A.  Proposal One: All Foreclosing Parties Should be Required, by Sworn 
Affidavit and Documentary Evidence, to Certify Their Standing to Foreclose 
to a Court of Law Before Initiating a Foreclosure 
As explained above, states use a variety of theories—lien or title—and a 
variety of instruments—mortgage or deed of trust—to establish a mortgage.  
The process to terminate that mortgage in foreclosure varies not only between 
judicial and non-judicial, but as to what documentation the lender needs to 
produce in order to have the right to foreclose.  Currently most of the loans 
secured by mortgages are promissory documents.276  Generally, in order to 
foreclose on a promissory note the lender needs to establish that it is the “person 
entitled to enforce the note” (PETE) under the Uniform Commercial Code.277  
Whether a lender also needs proof of the mortgage assignments varies by 
state.278  Prior attempts at uniformity have failed because they tried to unify 
these differing requirements.  Unifying what needs to be produced in order to 
establish the right to foreclose is not necessary.  What is necessary, however, is 
that the requirement be uniform.  Every lender in every state should be required 
to establish its standing to foreclose before it brings the process to a neutral 
third-party.  The trustee on a deed of trust is not a neutral party.279 
In non-judicial states, the servicers have easily been able to proceed with 
foreclosures with no proof of the right to do so.280  The practice continues to 
this date.  As recently as January of 2015, two different judges in two states 
found that Wells Fargo was proceeding with foreclosures without proof of 
standing.281  This first occurred in Missouri.282  Wells Fargo, through the 
trustee, the law firm of Kozeny & McCubbin,283 foreclosed on the homeowner 
despite receiving funds from the homeowners that were supposed to bring the 
note current.284  The court found that “[t]he undisputed facts are neither Wells 
Fargo . . had the right to enforce the note rendering the foreclosure sale 
 
 276. The specifics of non-promissory notes and electronic notes are beyond the scope of this article.  
Suffice it to say that an argument to unify the foreclosure process would have to include these documents as 
well.  Promissory notes predominate, so my examples focus on promissory notes. 
 277. See Renaurt, supra note 32; Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating 
to Mort. Notes, REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Nov. 
14, 2011), available at www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/. . ./PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111411.pdf. 
 278. See Elizabeth Renaurt, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time 
Bomb? 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 111 (2013). 
 279. Trustees really cannot be considered neutral and, therefore, would not be the proper party to meet 
this requirement.  See Campbell supra note 262, at 129–30. 
 280. Id. at 112–15 (discussing instances of wrongful foreclosure in non-judicial states). 
 281. Catherine Curan, NY Federal Judge Slams Wells Fargo for Forged Mortgage Docs, N.Y. POST (Jan. 
31, 2015), available at http://nypost.com/2015/01/31/ny-federal-judge-slams-wells-fargo-for-forged-
mortgage-docs/; Gretchen Morgenson, Two Judges Who Get It About Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/business/01gret.html. 
 282. Holm v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc., No. 08 CN-CV00944 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015).  It 
should be noted that Wells Fargo has indicated its intention to file an appeal in this matter. 
 283. This illustrates the due process problems of the trustee.  Here Kozney & McCubbin, the allegedly 
neutral Trustee on the deed of trust were also the lawyers for Wells Fargo.  Id. at 2. 
 284. Id. at 6. 
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void.”285  This dispute lasted six years and cost Wells Fargo $295,912.30 in 
actual damages and $2,959,123 in punitive damages.286  This could have been 
avoided with a simple requirement that the foreclosure party be required to 
prove its right to foreclose before proceeding to a foreclosure sale. 
In a similar case in the bankruptcy court situated in the Southern District 
of New York found that Wells Fargo was forging documents to prove the right 
to foreclose.287  Cynthia Carrsow-Franklin, the homeowner in this case, had a 
home in Texas, a non-judicial state that relies on deeds of trust.288  Wells Fargo 
presented a proof of claim that included documents the judge concluded were 
forged.289  In his order, Judge Drain found that the endorsement filed in the 
case “does show a general willingness and practice on Wells Fargo’s part to 
create documentary evidence, after-the-fact, when enforcing its claims, 
WHICH IS EXTRAORDINARY.”290 
These are just two examples of why the loan servicing industry continues 
to require scrutiny.  While it is clear that a uniform judicial foreclosure 
procedure would be preferable, the industry lobby is strong and it is probably 
not possible to win that fight.  It may be possible, however, to create a pseudo-
judicial procedure.  At a minimum, the procedure should require that a 
certification be filed and examined by a neutral third party before any 
foreclosure can be initiated, and that homeowners have a meaningful process 
by which to contest an erroneous filing.  Parties filing such a certification 
should be held to a standard of reasonable investigation such as that expressed 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.291  A uniform process requiring proof 
of standing prior to any foreclosure would eliminate some of the delays in 
foreclosure and restore confidence in a system gone amok.292 
 
 285. Id. at 3. 
 286. Id. at 8. 
 287. Curan, supra note 275; Morgenson, supra note 275. 
 288. In re Carrsow-Franklin, 524 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).  It should be noted that Wells Fargo 
has filed a notice of appeal in this matter. 
 289. Id. at 19. 
 290. Id. at 17–18 (emphasis in original). 
 291. Subsection (b) of the rule states as follows: 
REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented 
party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances: 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary 
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing 
new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; 
and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 292. See e.g., Renaurt, supra note 32 (providing examples of some of the other issues that faulty 
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B.  Proposal Two: Foreclosing Parties Must Certify That All Loss Mitigation 
Processes Have Been Completed Prior to Initiating Foreclosure 
It is true that federal law now requires an effort at loss mitigation prior to 
proceeding with a foreclosure.  It is also true that these regulations have been 
in effect for more than a year and many of the same problems persist.293  As 
Collins and Urban demonstrated, the act of monitoring the loss mitigation 
activity of the servicer may produce better results.294  However, states with 
mediation  programs report that cases are still proceeding to foreclosure when 
another option is possible.295  Numerous studies have documented that loan 
modification is a better economic solution for the lenders.  Fewer foreclosures 
is an economic win for the community. 
We have learned that homeowners in judicial foreclosure states are more 
likely to receive a loan modification.296  That, in and of itself, should be enough 
to prefer judicial foreclosure.  In the alternative, however, states should require 
lenders and their servicers to prove that all of the federally mandated loss 
mitigation procedures have been complied with before a foreclosure can be 
initiated.  For all the reasons stated previously, this proof needs to be submitted 
to a neutral third party.  Our judicial system is the best equipped third party. 
In addition, FHFA should strive to develop uniform standards for loan 
modification that focus on those homeowners whose homes can be saved.297  
This should include programs for defaults resulting from lost or reduced 
employment as we saw in the last crisis; but it should also address the common 
financial stresses associated with medical crisis and divorce.  A loss mitigation 
program that focuses on borrowers who had no control over the causes of their 
financial difficulties is less likely to create the moral hazard the industry so 
fears. 
C.  Proposal Three: A Lender Who Initiates, and Then Abandons a 
Foreclosure Process Should be Deemed to Have Abandoned the Security 
Instrument 
Finally, we face the problem of banks who abandon their foreclosure.  
Zombie loans are a significant problem, but not the focus of this paper.298  
 
documentation causes). 
 293. As a facilitator, I have not seen a significant difference in servicer behavior since the rules have been 
in effect.  The files are still not being processed quickly.  The paperwork is still becoming lost and multiple 
requests for the same information still occur. 
 294. See Collins, supra note 200. 
 295. See Gong, supra note 220, at 24 (finding that sixty-eight percent of the people who entered their 
program avoided foreclosure). 
 296. Collins, supra note 190, at 219. 
 297. The Federal Housing Finance Agency oversees Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank.  FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 298. See Linda Allen, Stavros Peristiani, & Yi Tang, Bank Delays in the Resolution of Delinquent 
Mortgages: The Problem of Limbo Loans, FORTHCOMING J. OF REAL EST. RESEARCH (Dec. 2013), available 
at 
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Zombie mortgages artificially inflate the timelines for foreclosure and clog the 
judicial system.299  Lenders can reasonably consider the economics of taking 
possession of a home.  They should not, however, be making that decision after 
they have completed the foreclosure process, dumping the abandoned property 
on the community.300  If a lender files a foreclosure and then abandons it, the 
security instrument should be deemed abandoned as well. 
Some states have attempted to accomplish this through abandoned 
property statutes.301  A more uniform process would be easier for servicers to 
comply with across state borders and would better protect homeowners and 
communities.  This crisis saw a huge rise in abandoned properties caused by 
bank walkaways and zombie mortgages.302  It is clear from the crisis we have 
just experienced that sometimes “not foreclosing” can also create problems.  
Abandoned properties cannot re-enter the market because of liens that almost 
always exceed the value of the property and have been abandoned by the 
industry.  Stripping those liens will allow those homes to re-enter the 
marketplace, even if that re-entry is at a discount. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Uniform judicial foreclosure is clearly the preferable method of 
foreclosure.  Political realities also make it unlikely to ever occur.  The lessons 
learned from the recent crisis demonstrate the need for a more uniform system 
that includes more oversight of the lending community.  The public has lost 
faith in both the lending community and the government that is seen to support 
it.  At a bare minimum, we need a foreclosure system that requires lenders to 
certify proof of standing to a neutral third party before foreclosure is initiated.  
 
http://pages.jh.edu/jrer/papers/pdf/forth/accepted/Bank%20Delays%20in%20the%20Resolution%20of%20D
elinquent%20Mortgages.pdf; Michael Schramm, April Hirsh, Dikwakar Vanapalli, Daniel J. Van Fro, Krist 
Moine Nelson, & Claudia Colton, Stalling the Foreclosure Process: The Complexity Behind Bank Walkaways, 
CTR. ON URB. POVERTY AND CMTY. DEV., MANDEL SCH. OF APPLIED SOC. SCI. (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://blog.case.edu/mass/2011/02/07/CUPCD_2011_02_07Stalling%20the%20foreclosure%20process-
%20th20%complexity%20behind%20bank%20walkaway.pdf.; Kate Buitrago, Deciphering Blight: Vacant 
Building Data Collection in the Chicago Six County Region, WOODSTOCK INST. (June 2013), available at 
http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/decipheringblight_buitrago_june2013.pdf. 
 299. For a discussion of Florida, New Jersey and New York see infra Part III.(C). 
 300.  See, e.g., Michelle Conlin, Special Report: The Latest Foreclosure Horror: The Zombie Title, 
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-usa-foreclosures-zombies-
idUSBRE9090G920130110; Sandra Livingston, Bank ‘Walkaways From Foreclosed Homes a Growing, 
Troubling Trend, THE PLAIN DEALER (July 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.cleveland.com/news/index.ssf/2009/07/bank_walkaways_from_foreclosed.html; Mary Ellen 
Podmolik, More Banks Walking Away From Homes, Adding to the Housing Crisis, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2011), 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-13/news/ct-biz-0113-walkaway—
20110113_1_foreclosure-process-foreclosure-filing-servicers; Susan Saulny, Banks Starting to Walk Away on 
Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 30, 2009), A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/us/30walkaway.html?. 
 301. See, e.g., WISC. STAT. ANN. § 845.102(1) (2012)  The Wisconsin Supreme Court holding allows the 
court to sell a foreclosed and abandoned property over the bank’s objection.  Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Carson, 
No. 2013AP544, 2015 WL 651968, at *1, (Wis. Feb. 17, 2015). 
 302. See sources cited supra note 283. 
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The lender should be incentivized to put as much effort into not foreclosing as 
it does into foreclosing.  As part of this process, proof of compliance with loss 
mitigation efforts should be required before any foreclosure is initiated.  
Finally, if the previous two conditions are met and foreclosure is still the only 
option, the lender should be required to move through the process quickly and 
completely.  Abandoning a foreclosure should result in an abandoned security 
instrument.  These small changes to the current system will begin to rebuild the 
trust so badly lost in the last crisis.  More importantly, it may help prevent, or 
at least mitigate, the next housing crisis. 
 
